Recognized Stature  Revisited: Could  Community Standards  Rescue Restrictive  Recognized Stature  Definition in Castillo v. G&M Realty L.P.? by McGrail, Caitlin M.
Volume 66 Issue 3 Article 4 
9-15-2021 
"Recognized Stature" Revisited: Could "Community Standards" 
Rescue Restrictive "Recognized Stature" Definition in Castillo v. 
G&M Realty L.P.? 
Caitlin M. McGrail 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr 
 Part of the Entertainment, Arts, and Sports Law Commons, First Amendment Commons, Intellectual 
Property Law Commons, Law and Society Commons, and the Litigation Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Caitlin M. McGrail, "Recognized Stature" Revisited: Could "Community Standards" Rescue Restrictive 
"Recognized Stature" Definition in Castillo v. G&M Realty L.P.?, 66 Vill. L. Rev. 615 (2021). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol66/iss3/4 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital 
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Villanova Law Review by an authorized editor of Villanova 
University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. 
2021]
Note
“RECOGNIZED STATURE” REVISITED: COULD “COMMUNITY
STANDARDS” RESCUE RESTRICTIVE “RECOGNIZED
STATURE” DEFINITION IN CASTILLO V.
G&M REALTY L.P.?
CAITLIN M. MCGRAIL*
“The making of a work of art is one historical process among
other acts, events, and structures — it is a series of actions in but
also on history.”1
I. THE GARDEN OF EARTHLY DELIGHTS:2 SHOULD PROTEST ART BE
PROTECTED UNDER THE VISUAL ARTISTS RIGHTS ACT?
On May 25, 2020, the death of George Floyd sparked protests around
* J.D. Candidate, 2022, Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law;
B.A. in Art History, 2014, Wellesley College. I want to thank the Villanova Law
community, my ever-supportive family, and my beloved dad, who I will always
aspire to be like.
1. This Note’s title is derived from EVELYN WAUGH, BRIDESHEAD REVISITED:
THE SACRED & PROFANE MEMORIES OF CAPTAIN CHARLES RYDER (Chapman and Hall,
1st ed. 1945).
T.J. CLARK, IMAGE OF THE PEOPLE: GUSTAVE COURBET AND THE SECOND FRENCH
REPUBLIC 1848–1851 13 (Thames & Hudson Ltd. ed., 1st ed. 1973) (emphasis
added).
2. Hieronymus Bosch, THE GARDEN OF EARTHLY DELIGHTS (Museo Del Prado
1490–1500), https://www.museodelprado.es/en/the-collection/art-work/the-gar
den-of-earthly-delights-triptych/02388242-6d6a-4e9e-a992-e1311eab3609 [https://
perma.cc/5ZL7-5LQX] (last visited July 9, 2021).  A three paneled interpretation
of Bosch’s imagining of the afterlife, this work’s meticulously detailed, surreal, and
sometimes grotesque imagery has captivated scholars and viewers alike for
centuries. See Pilar Silva, El Bosco. Trı́ptico del Jardı́n, in EL BOSCO. LA EXPLOSIÓN
DEL V CENTENARIO 330 (2016), https://www.museodelprado.es/en/the-
collection/art-work/the-garden-of-earthly-delights-triptych/02388242-6d6a-4e9e-
a992-e1311eab3609 [https://perma.cc/5ZL7-5LQX] (last visited July 9, 2021)
(citation omitted).  The theme of this Note was inspired by the Second Circuit’s
statement that there may be “rare cases[s] where an artist or work is of such
prominence that the issue of recognized stature need not be tried . . . .”  Castillo v.
G&M Realty L.P., 950 F.3d 155, 166 (2d Cir. 2020), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 363
(2020); see also Scott v. Dixon, 309 F. Supp. 2d 395, 400 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) (“[T]he
court can imagine a set of circumstances where an artist’s work is of such
recognized stature that any work by that artist would be subject to VARA [Visual
Artist Rights Act]’s protection . . . . For example, the court would be hard pressed
to hold that a newly discovered Picasso is not within the scope of VARA . . . .”).
The Author of this Note took this maxim to heart in developing a theme of
artworks for which the “recognized stature” designation is a foregone conclusion.
(615)
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the country.3  In the wake of this nationwide outcry, artists around the
country created public protest art with the potential of becoming a “mon-
uments of sorts” that “synthesize a moment” in history.4  Protest art takes
on the expressive intentions of its creators, imbuing visual media with pow-
erful iconography of resistance.5  Recent examples of protest art include
mural portraits of George Floyd on city streets and other images advocat-
ing for the Black Lives Matter movement.6  Protest art is “timeless iconog-
raphy” that inspires vigorous affinity for opposing the status quo.7
Notwithstanding protest art’s significance in the contemporary zeitgeist
and its potential historical impact, whether protest art, and public art gen-
erally, is legally protected from destruction under the Visual Artists Rights
Act (VARA) is an open question.8  In answering this question, courts must
turn to the “recognized stature” standard as VARA only prohibits destruc-
tion of art when it meets this standard.9
3. See Mackenzie Crosson et al., Protest Art Has Covered Boarded Up Businesses—
Will It Be Preserved?, WBEZ (July 11, 2020), https://www.wbez.org/stories/protest-
art-has-covered-boarded-up-businesses-will-it-be-preserved/e3db8017-a6ba-4dde-
9bc3-3d17f6ee5392 [https://perma.cc/J7R4-W2AD].
4. See id. (quoting Dorian Sylvain, artist and originator of Mural Moves, a Chi-
cago community arts campaign that mobilized mural painting in Chicago neigh-
borhoods during the summer of 2020).
5. See Michael Cavna, George Floyd’s Death Has Inspired Powerful Protest Art: ‘I
Needed to Have Another Way of Seeing Him’, WASH. POST (June 11, 2020), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/arts-entertainment/2020/06/11/protest-art-black-lives-
matter/ [https://perma.cc/X5UD-5Y9U] (describing creative process of protest
art creator).  Protest artist Simi Stone converted her despair following the deaths
of Ahmaud Arbery, Breonna Taylor, and George Floyd into a rendering of George
Floyd’s face after her boyfriend encouraged her to “[p]rotest on the canvas.” Id.
6. See Alexandra Schonfeld, The Art of Protest: Artists Create Images in Support of
Black Lives Matter, NEWSWEEK (June, 25, 2020), https://www.newsweek.com/art-
protest-artists-create-images-support-black-lives-matter-1512810 [https://perma.cc
/2FH2-9AHG] (describing, with images, protest art around the world, including
portraits of George Floyd in Manchester, England, a “gloved fist” in a Toronto
alley, and mural reading “Black Lives Matter” in Brooklyn).
7. LIZ MCQUISTON, PROTEST!: A HISTORY OF SOCIAL AND POLITICAL PROTEST
GRAPHICS 6 (Princeton Univ. Press ed., 2019) (describing impact of protest art as it
“represent[s] a power struggle; a rebellion against an established order and a call
to arms, or a passionate cry of concern for a cause”).
8. See supra notes 4–7 and accompanying text for recent examples of protest
art and their cultural effect.  VARA is codified at 17 U.S.C.A. § 106A (West 2021)
and the “recognized stature” provision is described in 17 U.S.C.A. § 106A(a)(3)(B)
(West 2021).  Commentators speculate on how courts will apply VARA to protest
art. See Andrea Arndt & Caleb Green, Black Lives Matter Murals: Intellectual Property
v. Real Property Rights, JD SUPRA (July 9, 2020), https://www.jdsupra.com/
legalnews/black-lives-matter-murals-intellectual-83384/ [https://perma.cc/X68B-
6P39] (“Street art, including temporary street murals, may be protected under the
Visual Artist Rights Act (VARA).”); Blake Brittain, Protest Art Fate Tied to Obscure,
Rarely Litigated Copyright Law, BLOOMBERG L., (July 16, 2020), https://
www.bloomberglaw.com/product/blaw/document/X8PVGGAK000000 [https://
perma.cc/DJC4-M57P] (“But how long those works stay visible may depend on
interpretations of a rarely tested part of copyright law . . . .”).
9. See infra Section II.A and accompanying text for a description of the “rec-
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The Second Circuit’s recent definition of “recognized stature” in Cas-
tillo v. G&M Realty L.P.10 highlights the challenges courts face in applying
the standard.11  In Castillo, the Second Circuit considered whether the de-
struction of graffiti collective 5Pointz in Queens, New York violated
VARA.12  In affirming the Eastern District of New York’s finding of viola-
tions of VARA, the Second Circuit refined the definition of “recognized
stature” to place more emphasis on the opinion of art experts than may be
appropriate based on administrative guidance and the Act’s legislative his-
tory.13  This Note critiques the Second Circuit’s definition of “recognized
stature” because protest art, and public art generally, may fall outside this
definition’s limited scope and thus outside the ambit of VARA’s protec-
tion, with adverse consequences for cultural and historical preservation.14
Acknowledging the inherent challenges in judicial treatment of “rec-
ognized stature,” this Note proposes the application of the “community
standards” analysis of First Amendment jurisprudence to evaluate recog-
nized stature.15  Part II provides the history and relevant case law of VARA,
offers context for protest art in the visual arts canon, recounts judicial
challenges with adjudicating art, and describes the role “community stan-
dards” plays in First Amendment analysis.  Part III describes the back-
ground of Castillo with a particular focus on litigation at the district court
level.  Part IV synthesizes the Second Circuit’s affirmation of the VARA
ognized stature” standard; see also Brittain, supra note 8 (“The scant law on the
topic doesn’t settle what recognized stature is . . . .”).
10. 950 F.3d 155 (2d Cir. 2020), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 363 (2020).
11. See, e.g., id. at 166 (“We conclude that a work is of recognized stature when
it is one of high quality, status, or caliber that has been acknowledged as such by a
relevant community.” (first citing Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 861 F. Supp 303,
324–25 (S.D.N.Y. 1995), aff’d in part, vacated in part, rev’d in part, 71 F.3d 77; then
citing Martin v. City of Indianapolis, 192 F.3d 608, 612 (7th Cir. 1999))); U.S.
COPYRIGHT OFFICE, AUTHORS, ATTRIBUTION, AND INTEGRITY: EXAMINING MORAL
RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES 77–78 (2019) (“[A]bsent statutory text or direct leg-
islative history, courts were left to develop a workable standard on their own, and
despite Congress’ intentions, such battles have occurred.”); Emma G. Stewart,
Note, United States Law’s Failure to Appreciate Art: How Public Art Has Been Left Out in
the Cold, 97 WASH. U. L. REV. 1233, 1249 (2020) (“The need to assess recognized
stature . . . has resulted in costly litigation for both artists and landowners alike.
Because a definition of recognized stature is not included in the statute, deciding
whether or not a work is eligible for protection from destruction . . . has been a
matter of interpretation for the courts.” (footnote omitted)).
12. See infra notes 107–18 and accompanying text for a history of 5Pointz,
and Section III for a narrative analysis of the Second Circuit’s opinion.
13. See Castillo, 950 F.3d at 166 (noting “recognized stature” determinations
should usually rely on expert opinion) and Section II.A for a description of
VARA’s legislative history and administrative guidance.
14. For a complete critical analysis of the inadequacies of the Second Circuit’s
application of “recognized stature,” see infra Section V.A.
15. See supra note 11 and accompanying text for an explanation of how the
absence of Congressional guidance on the “recognized stature” standard resulted
in an arguably imprecise judicial definition.  For an evaluation of the feasibility of
applying the “community standards” doctrine for findings of recognized stature,
see infra Section V.B.
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violations and damages award in Castillo.  Part V dissects the Second Cir-
cuit’s definition of “recognized stature” and recommends a broader defi-
nition of the term that incorporates “community standards” analysis.
Finally, the Note concludes in Part VI by contemplating the consequences
of losing cultural and historical heritage should protest art fail to gain
legal protection.
II. THE BIRTH OF VENUS:16 WHY WAS VARA ENACTED AND WHY DOESN’T
IT ACHIEVE THESE GOALS?
VARA attempted to protect artists and promote cultural preservation,
though courts interpreting its provisions have achieved mixed results.17
“Recognized stature” remains controversial, primarily due to its ambiguity,
even close to thirty years after VARA was enacted.18  In particular, the Sec-
ond Circuit’s recent revision to the judicial definition of “recognized stat-
ure” in Castillo may undermine the cultural preservation of protest art.19
Protest art spans the art historical canon from the ancient to the present,
offering a unique cohesion of a political moment and an artistic viewpoint
that resonates with both modern audiences and their future
counterparts.20
In rebuke of the Second Circuit’s apparent dismissal of community
perspective in evaluating whether art is protected, and in response to anxi-
ety about potential judicial transgressions when applying “recognized stat-
ure,” this Section explores “community standards” jurisprudence as a
potential blueprint to remedy these deficiencies.  Subsection A describes
the enactment of VARA and subsequent litigation interpreting its provi-
sions.  Subsection B illustrates the history of protest art and illuminates its
relevance in contemporary life.  Subsection C outlines the unsettled prece-
dent of art adjudication.  Subsection D presents a brief overview of the
ways the Supreme Court has used the “community standards” concept to
evaluate whether materials are obscene under the First Amendment and
the evolution of “community standards” at the district court level.
16. Sandro Botticelli, THE BIRTH OF VENUS (The Uffizi 1485), https://
www.uffizi.it/en/artworks/birth-of-venus [https://perma.cc/3LEK-4X9J] (last
visited July 9, 2021).  This Botticelli masterpiece portrays the winds ushering the
Roman god Venus to land on a seashell. See Birth of Venus, LE GALLERIE DEGLI
UFFIZI, https://www.uffizi.it/en/artworks/birth-of-venus [https://perma.cc/
3LEK-4X9J] (last visited July 9, 2021).  Exemplifying beauty and the bounty of
spring, this painting borrows heavily from Classical mythology and art. See id.
17. See infra notes 36–57 and accompanying text for an overview of judicial
interpretation of “recognized stature.”
18. See infra notes 31–35 and accompanying text for critiques of “recognized
stature.”
19. See Castillo v. G&M Realty L.P., 950 F.3d 155, 166 (2d Cir. 2020), cert.
denied, 141 S. Ct. 363 (2020) (emphasizing importance of expert opinions in “rec-
ognized stature” evaluations).  See infra Section V.A for an analysis of why the Sec-
ond Circuit’s opinion falls short of protecting protest art.
20. See supra notes 4–7 and accompanying text for a description of the signifi-
cance of protest art.
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A. Impression, Sunrise:21 What is VARA?
Enacted in 1990, VARA codifies the moral rights of artists in align-
ment with international precedent.22  Moral rights stem from the belief
that artists hold more than an “economic interest” in their creations and
are entitled to protection of the “creative persona” inherent in their art-
work.23  In addition to protecting moral rights, VARA supports cultural
preservation.24  VARA represents the United States’ commitment to the
Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (“the
Berne Convention”).25  The United States joined the Berne Convention in
1988, though the Convention’s first signatories date to 1886.26  VARA pro-
21. Claude Monet, IMPRESSION, SUNRISE (Musée Marmottan Monet 1872),
https://www.marmottan.fr/en/collections/highlights/ [https://perma.cc/FZD6-
CSVB] (last visited July 9, 2021).  Depicting the daybreak mists of Monet’s Le
Havre hotel, this painting’s title became the moniker of an entire movement. See
N. V. BRODSKAIA & N. N. KALITINA, THE ULTIMATE BOOK ON CLAUDE MONET 71
(2015).
22. See Edward J. Damich, The Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990: Toward a Federal
System of Moral Rights Protection for Visual Art, 39 CATH. U. L. REV. 945, 946 (describ-
ing history of VARA).  VARA was “tacked on” to the Judicial Improvement Acts of
1990 and was the first moral rights protection enacted at the federal level. See
Christopher J. Robinson, Note, The “Recognized Stature” Standard in the Visual Artists
Rights Act, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1935, 1935 (2000).  Though the importance of
moral rights had been recognized prior to VARA and states had passed moral
rights statutes, federal moral rights legislation had failed multiple times. See id. at
1941.
23. Robinson, supra note 22, at 1939 (describing moral rights protection).
Robinson notes that art—especially public art—has the potential to “ha[ve] a last-
ing effect on the artist’s reputation, with impact on his dignity and career.” Id.
Robinson notes that visual art is different from other types of art because “a dispro-
portionate percentage of the value of a work of fine art is in the physical object
created, rather than the exploitation of derivatives or copies.” Id. at 1936 (foot-
note omitted).  Another commentator similarly calls attention to the difference
between economic rights and moral rights: “[u]nlike the economic protection pro-
vided by copyright law, moral rights were created to protect an artist’s honor and
reputation.”  Stewart, supra note 11, at 1235–36.
24. See Robinson, supra note 22, at 1936 (describing twofold aims of VARA).
In addition to protecting moral rights, “VARA recognizes a public interest in the
encouragement of artists to work and in the preservation of their work once cre-
ated[,]” embracing a “public duty to preserve the nation’s art and cultural patri-
mony . . . .” Id.
25. See Damich, supra note 22, at 945–47 (describing history of VARA).
VARA’s protections align with article 6bis of the Berne Convention, though
Damich argues that VARA “does not bring United States law into conformity with
article 6bis.” Id. at 947.  Namely, article 6bis protects “all literary and artistic
works[,]” (not just visual art); provides for additional moral rights outside of those
protected by VARA; and extends the moral rights protections past the artist’s life-
time for “as long as economic (copyright) rights.” Id.  Damich additionally asserts
that VARA’s sanctioning of moral rights waivers fails to acknowledge “article 6bis’s
concern about protecting the artist even ‘against himself.’” Id.
26. See Sara Rosano & Birgit Kurtz, Tear Down This Wall? The Destruction of
Sanctioned Street Art Under U.S. and Italian Law, FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA &
ENT. L.J. 767, 771 (2020) (describing history of Berne Convention and remarking
on United States’ relative tardiness to the Berne Convention compared to the ten
5
McGrail: "Recognized Stature" Revisited: Could "Community Standards" Rescu
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2021
620 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66: p. 615
tects artists’ “right of attribution and . . . right of integrity.”27  This Note
concerns the scope of VARA’s protection of the right of integrity, through
which artists can either stop or claim damages “for the intentional distor-
tion, mutilation, modification, or destruction of [their] work.”28  Under
VARA, artists may “prevent any destruction of a work of recognized stature
. . . .”29 Additionally, VARA provides caveats for protection.30
Both VARA and the “recognized stature” standard have been the sub-
ject of significant criticism since VARA’s inception.31  VARA’s most vehe-
ment critics argue that its protections impermissibly infringe “basic
property and contract rights[.]”32  Another scholar asserts that VARA’s
definition of visual art is unforgivably narrow and the “recognized stature”
requirement should be done away with entirely.33  A less censorious critic
original signatories).  Ten countries signed on to the Berne Convention at its in-
ception. See id.
27. Robinson, supra note 22, at 1935–36.  Likely initiated in nineteenth-cen-
tury France, moral rights arguably reflect an appreciation of individual artistic bril-
liance and an acknowledgment of the importance of cultural preservation for
future artistic development. See id. at 1938–39.
28. Id. at 1936 (describing VARA’s breadth).  VARA protects all visual art
from forms of damage outside of destruction, such as “distortion, mutilation, and
modification . . . prejudicial to an artist’s honor and reputation . . . .” Id. at 1946.
One commentator notes that the differing threshold for protection for destruction
creates a “loophole” that “incentivizes property owners to destroy artwork that they
have damaged or wish to modify. . . . if not of recognized stature, a modified or
damaged work may give rise to liability— completely destroy that work, and the
liability vanishes.”  Stewart, supra note 11, at 1250.
29. 17 U.S.C.A § 106A(a)(3)(B) (West 2021).  Notably, the “recognized stat-
ure” requirement only applies to destruction of artworks. See Robinson, supra note
22 at 1946–47.  The prohibition of destruction of artwork of “recognized stature” is
not a part of the Berne Convention because destroyed artwork cannot injure an
artist’s standing. See id. at 1940.  A scholar analyzing “VARA’s threat to traditional
property and contract rights” argues that VARA oversteps by providing a remedy
for destruction when the Berne Convention itself does not provide this protection.
Drew Thornley, The Visual Artists Rights Act’s “Recognized Stature” Provision: A Case for
Repeal, 67 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 351, 369 (2019).  Furthermore, Thornley argues that
“recognized stature” provision can be repealed without sacrificing the United
States’ adherence to the Berne Convention. See id.
30. See Robinson, supra note 22, at 1948 (“Works that are incorporated into
buildings with the artist’s consent and that may not be removed without mutilating
or destroying the work are not protected by VARA.”).  See infra note 56 and ac-
companying text for a further discussion of the lack of protection for illegally in-
stalled artworks.
31. See Damich, supra note 22, at 962 (“Limiting the right against destruction
to works of recognized stature is inconsistent with moral rights theory, the Berne
Convention, and the United States copyright law tradition of refraining from judg-
ments as to quality.”); see also Robinson, supra note 22, at 1936 (describing “recog-
nized stature” as a “particularly contentious provision of VARA”).
32. Thornley, supra note 29, at 364 (criticizing “recognized stature” stan-
dard).  Thornley argues “[t]he 5Pointz ruling reveals the substantial threat the
Visual Artists Rights Act poses to our nation’s long-standing commitment to private
property and freedom of contract.” Id. at 370.
33. See Stewart, supra note 11, at 1257–59 (suggesting that “[i]n order to ade-
quately protect public artists and serve VARA’s purposes,” VARA’s definition of
6
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lamented the disappointing inclusion of the “recognized stature” standard
and predicted the potential for judicial misappropriation.34  The Castillo
defendants joined the chorus critical of the “recognized stature” standard;
maintaining that the “recognized stature” standard is “unconstitutionally
vague” in their attempt to overturn the Second Circuit’s holding.35
Congress’ lack of specificity, particularly on the function of the “rec-
ognized stature” standard, undercuts the implementation of VARA’s as-
pirational policies and enables judicial instability.36  To this end, one
scholar characterized VARA cases as reflecting uncertainty about the pro-
vision’s function and evidentiary standards.37  Despite this dearth of legis-
lative guidance, the Southern District of New York in Carter v. Helmsley-
Spear, Inc.38 deftly supplied the first test for courts to determine recog-
nized stature.39  In Carter, the Southern District of New York’s “recognized
stature” test required plaintiffs to “make a two-tiered showing: (1) that the
visual art in question has ‘stature,’ i.e. is viewed as meritorious, and (2)
that this stature is ‘recognized’ by art experts, other members of the artis-
tic community, or by some cross-section of society.”40  In particular, the
visual art should incorporate more types of art and the “recognized stature” re-
quirement be eliminated (footnote omitted)).  The statute’s definition of visual art
is limited to a “painting, drawing, print, or sculpture,” and “still photographic im-
age[s] produced for exhibition purposes only” in their original form or “in a lim-
ited edition of 200 copies or fewer[.]”  17 U.S.C.A. § 101 (West 2021).
34. See Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright in the 101st Congress: Commentary on the Vis-
ual Artists Rights Act and the Architectural Works Copyright Protection Act of 1990, 14
COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 477, 480 n.19 (1989) (arguing the “recognized stature”
standard “may be incoherent” due to difficulty of applying the standard potentially
leading to incongruous results).
35. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 22, Castillo v. G&M Realty L.P., 950 F.3d
155 (2d Cir. 2020) (No. 20-66) (“This case concerns an unconstitutional applica-
tion of an unconstitutionally vague statutory provision at odds with fundamental
legal principles and long-standing decisions of this Court.”).
36. See Robinson, supra note 22, at 1948 (“While VARA incorporated a person-
ality and preservation rationale, it left many questions of application of these twin
goals unanswered, not least the impact of the recognized stature standard.”); see
also Stewart, supra note 11, at 1249 (“VARA provides no guidance on how the term
should be understood.”).
37. See Robinson, supra note 22, at 1948 (“The litigation reveals confusion
over the purpose of the recognized stature provision—for example, whether the
standard is intended merely to filter out nuisance suits or should act as a substan-
tial hurdle for the plaintiff—and what type of proof is required to satisfy the
standard.”).
38. 861 F. Supp. 303 (S.D.N.Y 1994), aff’d in part, vacated in part, rev’d in part,
71 F.3d 77 (2d Cir. 1995).
39. See Robinson, supra note 22, at 1948–51 (describing Carter’s development
of “recognized stature” test, particularly the court’s “plain meaning” interpretation
of statute and acknowledgment of VARA’s preservative aims).
40. Carter, 861 F. Supp. at 325 (court’s “recognized stature” definition).  The
Southern District of New York granted the Carter plaintiffs a permanent injunction
to bar defendants from “distorting, mutilating, or modifying plaintiffs’ art work.”
Id. at 337.  On appeal, the Second Circuit found that the artwork at issue was
“‘made for hire;’” which is not protected under VARA.  Carter v. Helmsley-Spear,
Inc., 71 F.3d 77, 85 (2d Cir. 1995).  Thus, the Second Circuit vacated the perma-
7
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Southern District of New York’s clarification that “plaintiffs generally, but
not inevitably, will need to call expert witnesses to testify before the trier of
fact” to fulfill this definition forecasts the importance of art experts.41
Carter’s test remains dominant in contemporary adjudications of “recog-
nized stature.”42  In particular, the court’s emphasis on the need for ex-
pert witnesses was particularly persuasive for future adjudicators.43
After Carter, courts continued to flesh out VARA’s boundaries.44
Scholarly analyses of “recognized stature” determinations indicate that
courts have taken differing approaches when weighing the necessity of ex-
pert testimony in such cases.45  Community relevance supported a finding
of “recognized stature” in Hanrahan v. Ramirez46 in the Central District of
California.47  The Hanrahan court noted that the artwork at issue, an anti-
drug and alcohol mural created by a local artist and approximately 300
community members, met the “recognized stature” standard.48  To sup-
port this finding, the court cited to the recognition of the mural in a na-
tional mural contest and exhibition at the Canon Building of the United
States House of Representatives.49  Despite the absence of expert testi-
mony, corresponding evidence of public acclaim was sufficient to find
“recognized stature” for the Hanrahan court.50
nent injunction. Id. at 88.  The Second Circuit did not discuss the “recognized
stature” analysis. See Robinson, supra note 22, at 1948 n.135.  Nevertheless, Carter’s
test is the “prevailing standard” for “recognized stature” determinations. See Stew-
art, supra note 11, at n.135.
41. Carter, 861 F. Supp at 325 (providing additional detail on application of
“recognized stature” test).
42. See Cohen v. G & M Realty L.P., 320 F. Supp. 3d 421, 437 (E.D.N.Y. 2018),
aff’d sub. nom. Castillo v. G & M Realty L.P., 950 F.3d 155 (2d Cir. 2020), cert. denied,
141 S. Ct. 363 (2020) (“[T]he district court’s decision in Carter v. Helmsley-Spear,
Inc. . . . remains the seminal case interpreting the phrase ‘recognized stature’
. . . .”).
43. See Monika Isia Jasiewicz, “A Dangerous Undertaking”: The Problem of Inten-
tionalism and Promise of Expert Testimony in Appropriation Art Infringement Cases, 26
YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 143, 176 (2014) (noting significance of expert witness testi-
mony in VARA cases); Robinson, supra note 22, at 1951 (“The judge’s comments
on the need for expert testimony, his formulation of a two-pronged test for recog-
nized stature, and his insistence on the preservation rationale for the provision
have proved both influential and unfortunate.”); see also Hunter v. Squirrel Hill
Associates, L.P., 413 F. Supp. 2d 517, 520 (2005) (“[Recognized stature] finding
generally depends upon the testimony of experts.”).
44. See supra notes 36–56 for a description of VARA’s litigation history.
45. See Robinson, supra note 22, at 1948–63 (reviewing “recognized stature”
jurisprudence and noting lack of consistency in judicial deference to expert
opinions).
46. No. 2:97-CV-7470 RAP RC., 1998 WL 34369997 (C.D. Cal. June 3, 1998).
47. See id. at *4.
48. See id. at *1, *4 (describing creation of mural and finding that work meets
“recognized stature” standard).
49. See id. at *4 (reasoning that mural met “recognized stature” due to level of
recognition).
50. See Robinson, supra note 22, at 1954 (“[R]ecognized stature was found
based on national and local community reaction, with little reference to the world
8
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Similarly, in Martin v. City of Indianapolis,51 the Seventh Circuit ap-
plied the Carter test and affirmed a violation of VARA when the plaintiff
supplied letters, articles, and an award program in support of “recognized
stature” but no expert testimony.52  Nevertheless, in Scott v. Dixon,53 the
Eastern District of New York held that a “single article” about the work at
issue that does not address “the artistic merit of the [work at issue]” in the
absence of other evidence does not support a finding of recognized stat-
ure, even if other works by that artist may be of “recognized stature.”54  In
English v. BFC & R East 11th Street LLC,55 the Southern District of New
York held that VARA also does not protect the destruction of art created
on property without the permission of the property owner.56  Reviewing
“recognized stature” jurisprudence since VARA’s enactment, the United
States Copyright Office advocates for a more expansive definition of “rec-
ognized stature” that better aligns with Congress’s intentions to eschew a
“battle of expert witnesses” in favor of extending protection to art that is
meaningful in community contexts.57
of professional art criticism.”).  The Hanrahan court cited Carter throughout its
opinion but did not explicitly apply the Carter “recognized stature” test. Hanrahan,
1998 WL 34369997, at *3-5.
51. 192 F.3d 608 (7th Cir. 1999).
52. Id. at 612 (“It is true that plaintiff offered no evidence of experts or others
. . . . [p]laintiff’s evidence of ‘stature’ consisted of certain newspaper and magazine
articles, and various letters . . . as well as a program from the show at which a
model of the sculpture won ‘Best of Show.’”).  In Cohen, the Eastern District of
New York cited Martin in its reasoning for the proposition that “expert testimony is
not the sine qua non for establishing that a work of visual art is of recognized stature
. . . .”  Cohen v. G & M Realty L.P., 320 F. Supp. 3d 421, 438 (E.D.N.Y. 2018), aff’d
sub. nom. Castillo v. G & M Realty L.P., 950 F.3d 155 (2d Cir. 2020), cert. denied, 141
S. Ct. 363 (2020).
53. 309 F. Supp. 2d 395 (E.D.N.Y. 2004).
54. Id. at 398, 400 (noting that though artwork at issue may be of “artistic
merit,” the artwork had not met the “recognized stature” standard).  Furthermore,
the artwork at issue, a sculpture installed by the plaintiff in defendants’ backyard,
“was [n]ever open to view either by the general public or by any art critics” which
additionally supported a finding of no “recognized stature.” Id. at 398, 400.
55. No. 97 Civ. 7446(HB), 1997 WL 746444 (S.D.N.Y 1997).
56. See id. at *1, *5 (“The Court therefore holds that VARA does not apply to
artwork that is illegally placed on the property of others, without their consent,
when such artwork cannot be removed from the site in question.”).  However, the
English court did not address whether VARA applied to illegal artwork that could be
removed. See id.  A scholar has pointed to the Pollara district court’s reading of the
English court’s analysis and points to the Pollara district court’s conclusion that
“English is limited to the situation where the artwork cannot be removed without
destroying it.”  Rosano & Kurtz, supra note 26, at 775 (quoting Pollara v. Seymour,
150 F. Supp. 2d 393, 396 n.4 (N.D.N.Y. 2001), aff’d, 344 F.3d 265 (2d Cir. 2003)).
Rosano and Kurtz also point to “dictum” of the Pollara court finding “there is no
basis in the statute to find a general right to destroy works of art that are on prop-
erty without the permission of the owner.” Id. (quoting Pollara, 150 F. Supp. 2d at
396 n.4).
57. See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 11, at 77–80 (quoting H.R. REP. NO.
101-514, at 15 (1990)) (recounting legislative history of VARA’s enactment and
comparing to current judicial interpretations of VARA).
9
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B. Guernica:58 Why Is Protest Art Deserving of Legal Protection?
Visual art has provided a medium for protest for centuries.59  Protest
art can take a variety of forms, though this Note is particularly concerned
with public protest art, such as graffiti and murals.60  Political graffiti has
been recorded as early as ancient Rome and is inescapably entwined with
the aesthetics of its historical context.61  Following artistic progression in
the United States in the 1970s, graffiti enjoys broad recognition and ap-
preciation.62  As the term “graffiti” can conjure connotations of vandalism
and other illegal acts, graffiti may now bear the moniker of relatively un-
controversial names such as “street art or urban art.”63  Nevertheless, these
art forms retain an aura of proscribed and spontaneous creativity.64  Con-
temporary graffiti has entered the popular imagination through the works
of prominent graffiti artists, such as Banksy.65  The popularity of street art
58. Pablo Picasso, GUERNICA (Museo Nacional Centro de Arte Reina Sofia
1937), https://www.museoreinasofia.es/en/collection/artwork/guernica [https:/
/perma.cc/PPW2-WUM7] (last visited July 9, 2021).  An abstract but nevertheless
gripping portrayal of the aftermath of a bombing, Picasso’s work became an
allegory for the ravages of violence. See Paloma Esteban Leal, Guernica, MUSEO
NACIONAL CENTRO DE ARTE REINA SOFIA, https://www.museoreinasofia.es/en/
collection/artwork/guernica [https://perma.cc/PPW2-WUM7]. One commenta-
tor points to Guernica’s considerable influence as a tool of protest, noting
“Guernica so accurately and powerfully conveyed the ravages and despair of war
that it became influential rhetoric in multiple anti-war movements.”  Brooke Da-
vidson, Note, A Thousand Words: Pollara v. Seymour and the Trend to Under-Value and
Under-Protect Political Art, 14 DEPAUL J. ART, TECH. & INTELL. PROP. L. 257, 262
(2004).
59. See MCQUISTON, supra note 7, at 7 (“Social discontent and political protest
have been expressed visually as well as verbally throughout the ages.”).
60. See TV REED, PROTEST AS ARTISTIC EXPRESSION, in PROTEST CULTURES, A
COMPANION 78–84 (Kathrin Fahlenbrach, Martin Klimke & Joachim Scharloth
eds., 2016) (noting protest art has developed in multiple mediums, including thea-
tre, performance art, music, and “[g]raphic arts,” including posters and murals).
61. See Johannes Stahl, Graffiti, in PROTEST CULTURES 228 (Kathrin Fahlen-
brach, Martin Klimke & Joachim Scharloth eds., 2016) (describing history of graf-
fiti as “a permanent and immortal accompany of cultural history.”).  Stahl
characterizes graffiti as “a continuous factor in the history of protest.” Id. at 229.
62. See id. at 228 (“In our contemporary use, the term also can label an art
form, which . . . has developed an own pictural grammar and reached worldwide
extension after forceful impulses out of New York and Philadelphia since the
1970s.”).
63. Id. at 231 (describing change in graffiti vocabulary due to ongoing
criminalization and scrutiny).
64. Id. at 231 (noting these types of art still reflect “noncommanded and
partly nonpermitted public expression . . . .”).  Stahl notes though graffiti
originated from the ancient Greek word for writing (graphein) and was used in
Renaissance Italy to refer to a “decorative technique,” it took on its modern mean-
ing in nineteenth century France when “publications focused on graffiti as illegal,
scriptural, or pictural use of public walls.” Id. at 228.
65. See Castillo v. G&M Realty L.P., 950 F.3d 155, 168 (2d Cir. 2020), cert.
denied, 141 S. Ct. 363 (2020) (“Banksy’s work is nonetheless acknowledged, both by
the art community and the general public, as of significant artistic merit and cul-
tural importance.”).  The Second Circuit states that “ ‘street art’ . . . has emerged as
10
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represents the progression of the history of art from traditional canvases
on museum walls, to “readymade” art and pop art in the twentieth century
that brought artifacts of daily life into the museum space.66  Street art
pushed this further by eliminating the museum context entirely—art can
now be found on street corners, sidewalks, and building walls.67
Murals also serve as an important vehicle for protest art.68  Due to
their large size and placement on local streets, murals have the potential
to transform community spaces into enduring memorials to activism.69
Throughout the summer of 2020, artists created numerous murals across
the United States to “amplify” the current state of societal inequities.70
Protest art is not only a visual catalyst deployed in the contemporary mo-
ment, but a tool that can coalesce powerful emotions and captivating im-
agery for use in the present; it will ultimately become testimony of times
gone by for future generations.71
C. The Thinker:72 How Should Courts Assess Art?
Courts have long struggled with how to adjudicate art due to its inher-
a major category of contemporary art.” Id. at 167.  The court then quoted with
approval Richard Chused’s scholarship describing the cultural impact of street art
that has attained the distinction of “high art.” Id. at 167–68 (quoting Richard
Chused, Moral Rights: The Anti-Rebellion Graffiti Heritage of 5Pointz, 41 COLUM. J.L. &
ARTS 583, 583 (2018)).  Chused notes that “graffiti and street art” has developed
into a “major, quickly evolving, internationally recognized art form.”  Chused,
supra note 65, at 583.
66. See Emma C. Peplow, Note, Paint on Any Other Canvas: Closing a Copyright
Loophole for Street Art on the Exterior of an Architectural Work, 70 DUKE L.J. 885,
895–900 (describing progress of history of art from “Monet’s water lilies” to Marcel
Duchamp’s “readymades” to Andy Warhol’s Brillo boxes).
67. See id. at 898–900 (asserting that street art continues transition of art from
being mediated by museums to being integrated into everyday life: “[w]hereas pop
art grappled with whether ‘everyday objects’ could be art, street art grappled with
whether ‘post-museum art’ could exist. Could art be consumed by the masses
where the masses exist?” (footnotes omitted)).  Peplow notes that though art has
moved outside the museum space, the conventional art establishment still inter-
cedes with auctions and museum exhibitions of street art. Id.
68. See REED, supra note 60, at 84 (describing acclaimed, “deeply political”
works of notable twentieth-century Mexican muralists as prominent examples of
the “modernist mural art movement”).
69. See id. (Operating “on a grander scale,” “[m]urals can be integrated as
permanent parts of neighborhoods, where passersby are confronted with literally
larger than life images of protest.”).
70. See Arndt & Green, supra note 8 (“Artists . . . have joined the movement
and created street art throughout the United States, including Brooklyn, San Fran-
cisco, Austin, Cincinnati, and Charlotte.”).
71. See supra notes 4–7 and accompanying text for scholarly interpretation
about the significance of protest art.
72. Auguste Rodin, THE THINKER (Musée Rodin 1903), http://www.musee-
rodin.fr/en/collections/sculptures/thinker-0 [https://perma.cc/VU5D-BUT8]
(last visited July 9, 2021).  One of Rodin’s most enduring and recognizable
sculptures, this work captures a man entranced by the workings of his inner mind
while simultaneously evoking the latent potential of his powerful physicality. See
11
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ent subjectivity.73  Judicial handwringing about making value judgments
about art is commonly traced to Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes’ 1903 cop-
yright opinion, Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co.74  Justice Holmes fa-
mously warned his future counterparts from making “aesthetic judgments”
due to their lack of experience evaluating the merits of art.75  This long-
established approach to adjudicating aesthetics is termed the “doctrine of
avoidance” or “aesthetic neutrality.”76  Today, judges “perform analytical
jujitsu” when confronted with aesthetic judgment, giving the perfunctory
nod to Bleistein before applying an “ad hoc aesthetic theory of the court’s
own devising.”77  Justifications for this evasive approach include judges’
lack of relevant expertise and their concern about censorship, and the
randomness of subjective appraisals.78  Nevertheless, government bodies,
including courts, frequently make aesthetic judgments in varied aspects of
law, including tax, customs, freedom of speech, land use, and intellectual
property.79  Within the context of this Note, judges confront aesthetic
The Thinker, MUSEÉ RODIN, http://www.musee-rodin.fr/en/collections/sculptures
/thinker-0 [https://perma.cc/VU5D-BUT8] (last visited Feb. 27, 2021).
73. See Robert Kirk Walker & Ben Depoorter, Unavoidable Aesthetic Judgments in
Copyright Law: A Community of Practice Standard, 109 NW. U. L. REV. 343, 344 (2015)
(“[Courts] become utterly flummoxed when confronted with works of art.”).
74. 188 U.S. 239 (1903); see also Walker & Depoorter, supra note 73, at 345
(noting origin of “doctrine of avoidance” judicial stance).
75. See Walker & Depoorter, supra note 90, at 345.  Justice Holmes’ oft-quoted
phrase is as follows: “It would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only
to the law to constitute themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial illustra-
tions, outside of the narrowest and most obvious limits.”  Id. (quoting Bleistein, 188
U.S. at 251); see also Brian Soucek, Aesthetic Judgment in Law, 69 ALA. L. REV. 381,
382–83 (2017) (remarking on the ubiquity of Justice Holmes’ admonition).
76. Soucek, supra note 75, at 382–83 (2017) (“Holmes’s so-called aesthetic
neutrality or nondiscrimination principle has now become dogma.”(footnotes
omitted)); Walker & Depoorter, supra note 90, at 345 (describing developing of
“doctrine of avoidance” approach) (quoting Christine Haight Farley, Judging Art,
79 TUL. L. REV. 805, 815 (2005)).
77. Walker & Depoorter, supra note 73, at 347.  Here, the Second Circuit ac-
knowledged the futility of judicial aesthetic judgments by citing Bleistein as a justifi-
cation for deferring the aesthetic judgment to the “relevant community.”  Castillo
v. G&M Realty L.P., 950 F.3d 155, 166 (2d Cir. 2020), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 363
(2020).  Despite these protestations of judicial inadequacy, the Second Circuit nev-
ertheless applied a revised standard of “recognized stature” that inevitably forces
aesthetic judgment, belying the court’s intentions.  See id. and infra Section IV for
a discussion of the Second Circuit’s reasoning.
78. See Soucek, supra note 75, at 446 (describing rationalization of avoidant
approaches including the fact that “courts . . . are ill-equipped to engage with
aesthetics,” the “subjective or unpredictable nature of aesthetic judgment,” and
the specter of “censorship: worries about government-imposed aesthetic ortho-
doxy”); Walker & Depoorter, supra note 73, at 345–46 (noting the “unpredictabil-
ity” of art, judicial lack of experience, and potential for “a covert form of
censorship” as explanations for avoidant approaches).
79. See Soucek, supra note 75, at 384.
“These are the kinds of decisions made by the IRS every time it assesses
the value of a donated or inherited artwork; by courts when they decide
whether a work has serious enough artistic value to escape an obscenity
12
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judgments when determining whether the art at issue meets the “recog-
nized stature” standard.80  Commentators propose varying approaches to
reconcile the necessity of aesthetic judgments with its perceived risks.81
This Note explores the applicability of obscenity jurisprudence, specifi-
cally “community standards” analysis, for “recognized stature”
determinations.82
D. American Gothic:83 What Are “Community Standards,” What Role Do They
Play in First Amendment Jurisprudence, and What Do They Have to
Do With Art?
Similar to “recognized stature,” courts have struggled with how to de-
termine whether work is obscene and thus unshielded by the First Amend-
ment.84  Both obscenity and “recognized stature” require judicial
assessment of inherently subjective material.85  In that context, the Su-
preme Court has developed the concept of “community standards” as a
method of adjudicating issues of obscenity.86
charge; by customs officials when they decide whether a certain piece of
metal is a sculpture; by the National Endowment for the Arts when it
chooses what projects to fund; and by municipal historical preservation
committees when they decide whether proposed renovations will disrupt
the character of a neighborhood.”
Id. (footnotes omitted)).
80. See id. at 444 (“One place where VARA unavoidably demands aesthetic
judgment is in its protection against the destruction of works ‘of recognized stat-
ure.’” (citing 17 U.S.C.A. § 106A(a)(3)(B)) (West 2021)).
81. Compare id. at 458–66 (describing fitting aesthetic judgments within a
“First Amendment spectrum”), with Walker & Depoorter, supra note 73, at 376–79
(advocating for adoption of “Community of Practice” method).
82. See infra Section II.D for an overview of obscenity jurisprudence.  This
Note considers the applicability of the “community standards” approach as op-
posed to other theoretical frameworks because the Eastern District of New York
referenced “community standards” analysis.  See infra notes 96–97, 100, 126–29
and accompanying text for a description of the Eastern District of New York’s dis-
cussion of “community standards.”
83. See Grant Wood, AMERICAN GOTHIC (The Art Institute of Chicago 1930),
https://www.artic.edu/artworks/6565/american-gothic [https://perma.cc/HKB2-
CP99] (last visited July 9, 2021).  Instantly recognizable, Grant Wood’s portrait of
Midwestern farmers is commonly acknowledged as a critique of provincialism,
though Wood’s objective was instead to sentimentalize, and even endorse, the
pastoral American lifestyle. See American Gothic, THE ART INSTITUTE OF CHICAGO,
https://www.artic.edu/artworks/6565/american-gothic [https://perma.cc/HKB2-
CP99] (last visited July 9, 2021).
84. See Soucek, supra note 75, at 419 (2017) (“Obscene material falls outside
the protections of the First Amendment . . .[b]ut not until 1973, in Miller v. Califor-
nia, did the Court finally coalesce around a definition.”).
85. See id. at 382 (“Aesthetic judgment pervades the law . . . .  [I]n obscenity
cases . . . and throughout intellectual property law, judges and other government
officials are constantly deciding what is art, or what counts as artistically or aestheti-
cally valuable.”).
86. See Note, Community Standards, Class Actions, and Obscenity Under Miller v.
California, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1838, 1841 (1975) (“‘[O]bscenity’ is understood to be
a factual inquiry into what is offensively prurient to particular communities . . . .”).
13
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In evaluating whether a work is obscene, the Supreme Court first con-
siders “whether ‘the average person, applying contemporary community
standards’ would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the pruri-
ent interest . . . .”87  In Miller v. California,88 the Supreme Court granted
“broad discretion” to judges and juries to determine which community’s
standards should be applied.89  Additionally, the Supreme Court estab-
lished that “community standards” should be “statewide standards” as op-
posed to “national standard[s].”90  In subsequent obscenity cases, the
Supreme Court continued to sustain judges and juries deciding “the con-
tent of whatever community standards they apply.”91
More recently, in Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association,92 the
Supreme Court found a California statute that incorporated “community
standards” to impose limitations on the sale of “violent video games” to
minors unconstitutional.93  In a concurring opinion, Justice Alito took is-
sue with the “community standards” section of the statute.94  Justice Alito
found that the statute’s reference to “community standards” did not evade
constitutional course correction, because he reasoned that there is a lack
of community accord about what constitutes inappropriate violence that is
not at issue in obscenity determinations.95
87. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (first quoting Kois v. Wiscon-
sin, 408 U.S. 229, 230 (1972); then quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476,
489 (1957)) (describing first prong of three-prong obscenity test).
88. Id.
89. Note, supra note 86, at 1842 (describing import of Miller test in obscenity
determinations and Supreme Court’s deference to adjudicators in deciding “the
relevant community, and in applying that community’s measure of obscenity.”).
90. Id. (“[T]he Court . . . criticiz[ed] at length the national standard require-
ment . . . .”).  In Miller, the Supreme Court course corrected “national community
standards” utilized in prior cases due to their lack of workability. See id. at 1841; see
also Soucek, supra note 75, at 419–20 (“[T]he first two prongs of the Miller test—
both of which are judged against local standards” (emphasis added)).
91. Note, supra note 86, at 1842 (discussing Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153
(1974) and Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87 (1974)).  Discussing Jenkins, the
author notes that the Supreme Court does not require identification of the com-
munity whose standards are to be applied. See id.  In its consideration of Hamling,
the author characterizes the Supreme Court as considering the jury pool the rele-
vant community and giving “jurors free [rein] to apply their own conceptions of
community mores.” See id. at 1844.
92. 564 U.S. 786 (2011).
93. Id. at 788 (“We consider whether a California law imposing restrictions on
violent video games comports with the Fourth Amendment.”).  The California stat-
ute, CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1746–.5 (2009), defined these video games in part as those
“patently offensive to prevailing standards in the community as to what is suitable
for minors.” Id. at 789 (quoting CAL. CIV. CODE § 1746(d)(1)(A)).  The majority
found the statute unconstitutional as it did not pass strict scrutiny. See id. at 805.
94. See Brown, 564 U.S. at 812 (Alito, J., concurring) (describing constitution-
ally infirm qualities of “community standards” part of statute).
95. See id. (describing applicability of “community standards”).  Justice Alito
characterized the California statute as attempting to skirt “vagueness problems” by
couching its “community standards” within the scope of Miller. Id. at 808, 812.  In
finding that “community standards” were not applicable, Justice Alito considered
14
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“Community standards” entered the “recognized stature” conversa-
tion when the Eastern District of New York considered the advisory jury
opinion while determining whether the destruction of 5Pointz violated
VARA in Castillo.96  The Eastern District of New York noted advisory juries
are “particularly appropriate in cases involving community-based stan-
dards.”97  The Castillo petitioners cited Justice Alito’s reasoning in their
petition for certiorari to similarly distinguish “community standards” in
the obscenity context from “community standards” in the “recognized stat-
ure” context.98  The Castillo defendants dismissed the application of “com-
munity standards” in “recognized stature” determinations in their petition
for certiorari.99
that obscenity implicates “generally accepted norms concerning expression related
to sex[ ]” and there are no equivalent mores regarding violence.  Id. at 812.  Thus,
Justice Alito reasoned that these flaws in the statute “fail[ ] to provide the fair
notice that the Constitution requires.” Id. at 813.
96. See Cohen v. G&M Realty L.P., 320 F. Supp. 3d 421, 430–31 (E.D.N.Y.
2018), aff’d sub nom., Castillo v. G&M Realty L.P., 950 F.3d 155 (2d Cir. 2020), cert.
denied, 141 S. Ct. 363 (2020) (“Under these principles, the Court will take the jury’s
verdicts under advisement in making its independent findings of fact and conclu-
sions of law, especially on issues that require judgment of the community.” (foot-
note omitted)).  The Eastern District of New York declined to inform the advisory
jury that “their findings would only be advisory” in order “[t]o enhance the integ-
rity of their verdicts . . . .” Id. at 431.  After considering the advisory jury’s findings
that twenty-eight out of a sum forty-nine pieces of art at issue had “achieved recog-
nized stature,” the Eastern District of New York judge extended the “recognized
stature” designation to another seventeen pieces of art for a total of forty-five
pieces of “recognized stature” that had been destroyed. Id. at 431, 439–40.  The
jury also found that that eight works constituted VARA violations as they “had been
mutilated, distorted, or otherwise modified to the prejudice of the artists’ honor or
reputation;” VARA violations that do not require a finding of “recognized stature.”
Id. at 431.  See supra notes 28–29 and accompanying text for a discussion of these
VARA provisions.
97. See Cohen, 320 F. Supp. 3d at 430 (quoting NAACP v. Acusport Corp., 226
F. Supp. 2d 391, 398 (E.D.N.Y. 2002)) (justifying use of advisory jury).  In NAACP,
the Eastern District of New York judge noted that “[a]dvisory juries are particularly
useful in cases in which ‘there are special factors . . . which suggest that a jury
composed of members of the community would provide the Court valuable gui-
dance in making its own findings and conclusions.’” NAACP, 226 F. Supp. 2d at
398 (quoting Skoldberg v. Villani, 601 F. Supp 981, 982 (S.D.N.Y 1985)).  The
NAACP judge then cited to numerous cases ratifying the use of an advisory jury to
support use of an advisory jury in the instant case to “advise the court on the ques-
tion of whether defendant gun manufacturers and distributors have created a pub-
lic nuisance and, if so, to provide guidance on the nature of appropriate injunctive
relief.” Id. at 399–400 (citing Note, supra note 86, at 1371–76).
98. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 35, at *29 n.20 (“To the
extent the ‘recognized stature’ provision might be analogized to ‘community stan-
dards’ provisions in other legislation, the ‘recognized stature’ provision has ‘no
similar history’ remotely comparable to experience with the conduct regulated in
those statutes.” (citing Brown, 564 U.S. at 812) (Alito, J., concurring)).
99. See id.  The Castillo defendants intended to undermine the applicability of
“community standards” analysis to advance their argument that the “recognized
stature” standard is fatally ambiguous and cannot be saved by “community stan-
dards.” See id.
15
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Though “community standards” are more commonly found in ob-
scenity jurisprudence, the Eastern District of New York introduced “com-
munity standards” to assist in gauging “recognized stature.”100
Additionally, the Eastern District of New York has used advisory juries, par-
ticularly for their use in assessing “community standards,” to adjudicate
legal issues outside of obscenity.101  The particularized ability of local ju-
rors to apply “community standards” is a factor some judges consider
when deciding on motions to transfer.102
Public opinion has been a part of “recognized stature” determina-
tions since Carter.103  “Community standards” analysis operates as a viable,
though admittedly imperfect, method for courts to incorporate public
opinion in the obscenity environment.104  The workability of “community
standards” in the obscenity context and other cases requiring the opinion
100. See Brown, 564 U.S. at 812 (Alito, J., concurring) (noting history of “com-
munity standards” evaluation in obscenity context); Cohen, 320 F. Supp. 3d at
430–31 (“Because advisory juries permit community participation and may incor-
porate the public’s views of morality and changing common law, their use is partic-
ularly appropriate in cases involving community-based standards” (quoting
NAACP, 226 F. Supp. 2d at 398)).
101. See NAACP, 226 F. Supp. 2d at 400 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (ordering empanel-
ment of advisory jury in nuisance case because “[i]t is appropriate to take into
consideration the values and standards of the community through the use of an
advisory jury . . . .”).  The Eastern District of New York cited to NAACP to support
the assertion that advisory juries can provide relevant guidance for the court in
assessing community standards. See Cohen, 320 F. Supp. 3d at 430 (citing NAACP,
226 F. Supp. 2d at 398).
102. See 15 ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 3854 (4th
ed. 2020) (“Courts also have considered whether a jury in the transferor or the
transferee district would be better equipped to apply community standards . . . .”).
Miller cites to numerous cases applying this principle: Keefe v. Simons, 2013 WL
3243110, at *6 (noting “where a jury could best apply community standards” is a
transfer factor in case with non-obscenity underlying cause of action),);), Grainger
v. Reiner, 2012 WL 386722, at *3 (N.D. Ill. 2012) (same); Coffey v. Van Dorn Iron
Works, 796 F.2d 217, 218, 221 (7th Cir. 1986) (same) (first citing Chance v. E. I.
Du Pont De Nemours & Co., Inc., 371 F. Supp. 439, 439 (E.D.N.Y. 1974); then
citing 15 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCE-
DURE § 3854 (1986)); Conseco Life Ins. Co. v. Reliance. Ins. Co. 2001 WL 1631873,
at *5 (N.D. Ill. 2001) (transferring insurance dispute to “permit the application of
community standards by the trier of fact” among other reasons); Chance v. E.I. Du
Pont De Nemours & Co., Inc., 371 F. Supp. 439, 449 (E.D.N.Y. 1974) (severing and
transferring products liability cases when “resolution of these claims is most likely
to be achieved by subjecting them to the critical scrutiny of local jurors with knowl-
edge of local practice . . . [c]ommunity standards are a vital element in assessing
the actions of the parties in this suit.”).
103. See supra notes 38–43 and accompanying text for a description of the
Carter test and legacy. This Note refers to “community opinion” or “public opin-
ion” to refer to lay opinions about art, often originating in the local community in
which the art resides.
104. See Note, supra note 86, at 1371–72 (“Issues of community participation
in the areas of obscenity . . . portray the possibilities and dangers of advisory jury
use. . . .  The community participation element of advisory juries makes them espe-
cially attractive to judges trying cases under civil obscenity statutes.”).  This com-
mentator finds advisory juries invite “greater participation of members of the
16
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of local communities or the broader public suggests “community stan-
dards” may be a serviceable adjudicative tool in comparably fraught “rec-
ognized stature” valuations.105
III. THE LAST SUPPER:106 THE BETRAYAL OF 5POINTZ
Originally a water meter factory, the Neptune Meter’s most famous
metamorphosis is arguably its penultimate, “Aerosol Art Centre” “5Pointz:
The Institute of Higher Burning[.]”107  Under the auspices of curator
Jonathan Cohen, who selected and cultivated aerosol artists to fill its exte-
rior canvases, 5Pointz engendered a local following.108  The once derelict
building transformed into a “living monument, spawning” worldwide ap-
preciation and visitation from both artists and lay people.109  Despite the
building’s significance as a “cultural institution,” Gerald Wolkoff, the
5Pointz property owner, destroyed 5Pointz in the middle of the night as
the latest provocation in his increasingly heated attempts to develop the
nonlegal community,” which has the benefit of “the influence of broader commu-
nity norms” with the risk of “narrow parochialism . . . .” Id. at 1371.
105. See supra Section II.D for a description of “community standards” analy-
sis in obscenity and other cases, and infra Section V.B for the argument in favor of
applying “community standards” to “recognized stature” decisions.
106. Leonardo da Vinci, THE LAST SUPPER (Santa Maria delle Grazie
1495–1498).  This ill-fated and world-famous mural of Christ eating his final meal
amongst his treacherous disciples was itself betrayed by Leonardo’s unorthodox
painting technique which caused the mural to decline shortly after its completion.
See ANNA ABRAHAM, LEONARDO DA VINCI 34-35 (2014).  The Author of this Note
hopes the allegorical similarity of The Last Supper’s demise and the perfidy that
befell 5Pointz is clear to the reader.  See infra notes 107–11 and accompanying text
for a description of 5Pointz’s destruction.
107. Mekhala Chaubal & Tatum Taylor, Lessons from 5Pointz: Toward Legal Pro-
tection of Collaborative, Evolving Heritage, 12 FUTURE ANTERIOR: J. HISTORIC PRES.,
HIST., THEORY, & CRITICISM 77, 77–78 (2015) (describing lifespan of the historic
Neptune Meter building).  The Neptune Meter building in Queens, New York, has
undergone many iterations since its construction in 1892. See id. at 77 (“The for-
mer Neptune Meter building was constructed in 1892 as a factory for the produc-
tion of water meters, continuing to serve this function until 1972 . . . .”).  Chaubal
and Taylor relate Gerald Wolkoff’s purchasing of the property in the early 1970’s
before leasing studios within the building to artists and allowing aerosol artists to
use the outside of the building. See id.  Though intended as a prophylactic mea-
sure to limit illegal graffiti elsewhere, what was known as the Phun Phactory “at-
tracted criticism from vocal detractors . . . who feared that the project was
glorifying vandalism.” Id.  When the Phun Phactory became “unmanageable” for
Mr. Wolkoff, the partnership with Mr. Cohen to oversee the site to “increase [the
artworks’] quality and cohesion” seemed a suitable solution. Id. at 78.
108. See Chaubal & Taylor, supra note 107, at 77.  Passengers on the high-
volume New York City 7 subway train could view the site, which boosted its popu-
larity. See Chused, supra note 65, at 585 (“The notoriety of the site was enhanced
by its visibility from the heavily used 7 train as it passed nearby on an above ground
portion of the New York City subway system.”).
109. See Chaubal & Taylor, supra note 107, at 77 (relating 5Pointz’s impact in
both the local and international art communities as “a major destination for inter-
national graffiti artists and tourists alike.”).
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site into apartment buildings.110
Confronting the complete devastation of 5Pointz, the 5Pointz artists
pivoted from their now futile legal maneuvers to preserve the site to a
post-mortem attempt to seek retribution for the destruction under a sel-
dom tried and “obscure”111 amendment to the Copyright Act, VARA.112
The artists’ successful suit was the first instance where a federal court
found a private property owner had infringed artists’ VARA rights.113
5Pointz began when the defendant property owner, Mr. Wolkoff, re-
cruited one of the plaintiffs, Mr. Cohen, to curate a public art space at Mr.
Wolkoff’s run-down properties in Long Island City, New York in 2002.114
This relationship proved fruitful for both Mr. Wolkoff and Mr. Cohen.115
Mr. Cohen engaged aerosol artists and transformed the space into
5Pointz, a “major global center for aerosol art” that enjoyed significant
publicity.116  The once symbiotic relationship soured when Mr. Wolkoff
began the process of developing the site in 2013.117  Mr. Cohen futilely
attempted to save 5Pointz through pleas to the New York City Landmark
110. See id. (“[T]he 5Pointz Aerosol Art Centre had received international
attention as a ‘mecca for graffiti artists’ and a ‘cultural institution.’” (footnote
omitted)).  After the artists’ failed attempt for a preliminary injunction, Mr.
Wolkoff banned the artists’ from accessing the art and hired workers to “white-
wash[ ]” 5Pointz.  Castillo v. G&M Realty L.P., 950 F.3d 155, 163 (2d Cir. 2020),
cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 363 (2020); see also Chused, supra note 65, at 591 (describing
Wolkoff’s efforts to prepare the buildings for development and the artists attempts
to save the site through both preservation and legal avenues).  Mr. Wolkoff passed
away in July 2020.  Dana Chiueh, Prominent Long Island Developer Jerry Wolkoff Dies,
LONG ISLAND PRESS (July 20, 2020), https://www.longislandpress.com/2020/07/
20/prominent-long-island-developer-jerry-wolkoff-dies/ [https://perma.cc/94UG-
UL9Z].
111. See Brittain, supra note 8 (noting “scant law” analyzing the “recognized
stature” standard).
112. See Robinson, supra note 22, at 1948 (describing circumstances of
VARA’s enactment as “narrow but profound amendment to the Copyright Act.”).
113. See Thornley, supra note 29, at 352 (noting that the Eastern District of
New York’s holding was “first time [ ] that a property owner violated visual artists’
moral rights, per VARA . . . .”).
114. Castillo, 950 F.3d at 162 (explaining historical relationship between par-
ties and origin of dispute).  The Second Circuit characterized Mr. Cohen as “a
distinguished aerosol artist[.]” Id.  Prior to 2002, aerosol artists had used the
space, known as the “Phun Phactory,” with Mr. Wolkoff’s permission since 1993.
See Chused, supra note 65, at 584–85.  Mr. Wolkoff’s arrangement with Mr. Cohen
represented a new era for the site, as Mr. Cohen “organize[d], control[led] and
curate[d] the creative endeavors of artists from all over the world seeking access to
the site.” Id.
115. See Castillo, 950 F.3d at 162 (recounting longstanding working relation-
ship between the parties).
116. Id. (illustrating public exposure of 5Pointz which “attracted thousands of
daily visitors, numerous celebrities, and extensive media coverage”).
117. Id. at 162–63 (noting Mr. Cohen learned of Mr. Wolkoff’s plans to raze
the site to build luxury apartments when Mr. Wolkoff began the development
process).
18
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 66, Iss. 3 [2021], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol66/iss3/4
2021] NOTE 633
Preservation Commission and fundraising to buy the property outright.118
With other 5Pointz artists, Mr. Cohen began seeking legal remedies
under the Visual Artists Rights Act (VARA).119  First, the plaintiffs received
a temporary restraining order.120  Following the lapsing of the temporary
restraining order, the plaintiffs unsuccessfully attempted to receive a pre-
liminary injunction.121  The Eastern District of New York denied the pre-
liminary injunction on November 12, 2013 and issued an opinion on
November 20, 2013.122  On the same day, Mr. Wolkoff closed the site to
the artists before authorizing workers to “whitewash[ ]” 5Pointz.123
Subsequently, nine other 5Pointz artists also sought relief under
VARA.124  Following consolidation of the two suits, the Eastern District of
New York held a three week trial.125  Though initially a jury trial, the plain-
tiffs consented to waive the jury resulting in the use of an advisory jury.126
The Eastern District of New York considered the jury’s findings in reach-
ing its verdict, particularly when deciding “issues that require judgment of
the community.”127  Furthermore, the “[c]ourt was keen to learn whether
the jurors, as members of the community” believed the art pieces met the
“recognized stature” standard.128  The court also considered the jury to be
118. Id. at 162 (relating Mr. Cohen’s bids to preserve 5Pointz).  The New York
City Landmark Preservation Committee denied the application. Id.  A commenta-
tor has speculated that the application was unsuccessful because the aerosol art did
not meet the thirty-year requirement for preservation. See Chused, supra note 65,
at 591.  Mr. Cohen’s intention to purchase the property became unrealistic when
an October 2013 variance significantly enhanced the land’s worth from $40 mil-
lion to $200 million. See Rosano & Kurtz, supra note 26, at 779.
119. Castillo, 950 F.3d at 163 (describing plaintiffs’ initial legal action).
120. Id. (citing Cohen v. G&M Realty L.P., 988 F. Supp. 2d. 212, 214 n.1
(E.D.N.Y. 2013)).
121. Id. at 163 (citing Cohen, 988 F. Supp. 2d at 214) (describing Eastern Dis-
trict of New York’s order denying preliminary injunction with forthcoming
opinion).
122. Id.; Cohen, 988 F. Supp. 2d at 214 (Eastern District of New York’s opinion
denying the preliminary injunction).  One commentator has described the Eastern
District of New York’s opinion denying the preliminary injunction as a “woefully
inadequate analysis of the legal issues in the dispute.”  Chused, supra note 65, at
590.  Chused’s critique faults the Eastern District of New York’s holding that the
artists were effectively on notice of destruction because of both the “impermanent”
nature of graffiti and because use of the art space was contingent on the status of
the redevelopment plans. Id. at 596–97.
123. Castillo, 950 F.3d at 163 (describing Mr. Wolkoff’s destruction of
5Pointz).
124. Id.
125. Id. (describing Eastern District of New York trial).
126. Id.  When advisory juries are used, judges retain the burden of determin-
ing the verdict. See id.  Judges consider and implement the advisory jury’s findings
at their discretion. See id.
127. Cohen v. G&M Realty L.P., 320 F. Supp. 3d 421, 430 (E.D.N.Y. 2018),
aff’d sub nom., Castillo, 950 F.3d 155, cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 363 (2020) (describing
reliance on advisory jury).
128. Id. at 430 (describing Eastern District of New York appraisal of advisory
jury).
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a proxy for the opinion of the broader community.129
The Eastern District of New York held that Mr. Wolkoff willfully vio-
lated VARA, granting the plaintiffs $6,750,000 in statutory damages.130  In
its holding, the Eastern District of New York concluded that forty-five of
the forty-nine works at issue fit the definition of “recognized stature.”131
Then, the defendants filed post-trial motions under Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure 52(b) and 59(a) to either grant a new trial, find for the defend-
ants, or grant remitter.132  In denying the motions, the Eastern District of
New York recounted the evidence that led the court to find “recognized
stature” had been met.133  In explaining its holding on each work of art,
the Eastern District of New York detailed why the works met “recognized
stature” by one or more of three groups of “art experts, other members of
the artistic community, or by some cross-section of society.”134  The East-
ern District of New York deliberately delineated that each of these catego-
ries are sufficient to establish “recognized stature.”135
IV. AUTUMN RHYTHM:136 A NARRATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE SECOND
CIRCUIT’S RUMBA WITH RECOGNIZED STATURE
In affirming the Eastern District of New York’s finding for the 5Pointz
artists, the Second Circuit identified the core issue on appeal as whether
129. Id. (“[S]ince 5Pointz had achieved worldwide community recognition, the
Court was keen to learn whether the jurors, as members of the community, would view
the works as having achieved recognized stature under VARA.” (emphasis added)).
130. Castillo, 950 F.3d at 163.
131. Id. (noting Eastern District of New York’s findings).
132. Cohen v. G&M Realty, No. 13-CV-05612(FB)(RLM), 2018 WL 2973385,
at *1 (E.D.N.Y June 13, 2018) (citation omitted) (describing post-trial litigation,
defendants requested the court “set aside the [c]ourt’s findings of fact and conclu-
sions of law and grant a new trial or, alternatively, to vacate the judgment in plain-
tiff’s favor and enter judgment for defendants, or alternatively, for remitter.”).
133. Castillo, 950 F.3d at 164 (noting Eastern District of New York’s approach
in response to post-trial motions: “marshall[ing] the evidence in the record sup-
porting the court’s findings as to the recognized stature of each work in
question.”).
134. Cohen, 2018 WL 2973385, at *7 (emphasis added) (quoting Carter v.
Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 861 F. Supp. 303, 325 (S.D.N.Y), aff’d in part, vacated in part,
rev’d in part, 71 F.3d 77 (2d Cir. 1995)) (advancing format of analysis).
135. Id. (“These three categories are conjugated with ‘or’; that is, the artist’s
work needs recognition by only one of these three groups.”).  For example, in
describing the evidence in favor of a finding of “recognized stature” for a plaintiff’s
work 7 Angle Time Lapse, the court noted that the work enjoyed significant public
visibility, “was featured in 14 documentaries,” and “the jury found it achieved rec-
ognized stature.” Id. at *31.
136. See Jackson Pollock, AUTUMN RHYTHM (The Metropolitan Museum of Art
1950), https://www.metmuseum.org/art/collection/search/488978 [https://
perma.cc/ZX39-JNJY] (last visited July 9, 2021).  This larger-than-life painting is
characteristic of Pollock and his signature “drip” methodology, invoking the
tumult of seasonal change. See Autumn Rhythm, THE METROPOLITAN MUSEUM OF
ART, https://www.metmuseum.org/art/collection/search/488978 [https://per
ma.cc/ZX39-JNJY] (last visited July 9, 2021).
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the destroyed 5Pointz artworks were of “recognized stature.”137  After re-
viewing VARA’s statutory provisions and the protections it affords, the Sec-
ond Circuit found “that a work is of recognized stature when it is one of
high quality, status, or caliber that has been acknowledged as such by a
relevant community.”138  The Second Circuit further clarified that:
[a] work’s high quality, status, or caliber is its stature, and the
acknowledgement of that stature speaks to the work’s recogni-
tion. The most important component of stature will generally be
artistic quality.  The relevant community will typically be the artistic
community, comprising art historians, art critics, museum cura-
tors, gallerists, prominent artists, and other experts.139
In justification of this definition of relevant community, the Second Cir-
cuit reasoned that the standard safeguards national cultural history.140
The Second Circuit then conceded the impropriety of courts making
value judgments about the quality of art and referenced Justice Holmes’
warning that judges are not qualified to evaluate art.141  Nevertheless, the
Second Circuit maintained that its mutable interpretation of “recognized
stature” does not stray too far afield of Justice Holmes’s proscription be-
cause “expert testimony or substantial evidence of non-expert recognition
will generally be required to establish recognized stature.”142
After reviewing the Eastern District of New York’s determinations of
recognized stature, the Second Circuit noted that the district court’s hold-
ing can only be overturned on the basis of “clear error.”143  The Second
Circuit found no statutory support for the defendants’ contentions that
VARA does not protect temporary art, such as 5Pointz.144  Citing examples
137. Castillo, 950 F.3d at 166 (“The crux of the parties’ dispute on this appeal
is whether the works at 5Pointz were works of ‘recognized stature,’ thereby pro-
tected from destruction . . . .”).
138. Id. (first citing Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 861 F. Supp. 303, 324-25
(S.D.N.Y 1994), aff’d in part, and vacated in part, and rev’d in part, 71 F.3d 77 (2d Cir.
1995); then citing Martin v. City of Indianapolis, 192 F.3d 608, 612 (7th Cir. 1999))
(providing “recognized stature” definition).
139. Id. (emphasis added) (providing additional clarification on definition of
“recognized stature”).
140. Id. (“VARA protects ‘the public interest in preserving [the] nation’s cul-
ture (quoting Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, 71 F.3d 77, 81 (2d Cir. 1995))).
141. Id. (“After all, we are mindful of Justice Holmes’s cautionary observation
. . . .”).  The Second Circuit further quotes Justice Holmes that “[i]t would be a
dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the law to constitute themselves
final judges of the worth of [visual art].” Id. (quoting Bleistein v. Donaldson Litho-
graphing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903)).
142. Id. (“This approach also ensures that the personal judgment of the court
is not the determinative factor in the court’s analysis.” (citing Robinson, supra note
22, at 1945 n.84 (2000))).
143. Id. at 167 (describing appellate standard of review).
144. Id. (“We see nothing in VARA that excludes temporary artwork from
attaining recognized stature.”).  The Second Circuit clarified that a prerequisite of
permanence would contravene Congress’s intent and overstep judicial boundaries
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of “temporary” art that have generated acclaim, the Second Circuit con-
cluded that temporary art is not excluded from “recognized stature.”145
Agreeing with the Eastern District of New York, the Second Circuit ob-
served that VARA provides for “durational limits” in the statute’s text.146
The Second Circuit then considered and dismissed the defendants’
additional contentions that the district court misapplied the “recognized
stature” standard.147  The defendants first argued that the Eastern District
of New York mistook “recognized stature” for “recognized quality” and
that evaluation of “recognized stature” should be backdated to the date of
destruction rather than determined at trial.148  The defendants also ar-
gued that the plaintiffs’ expert witness’s testimony received undue
credence when the expert witness had not observed all of the works at
issue, and that Mr. Cohen’s testimony on both his curatorial work and
5Pointz as a whole was afforded inappropriate influence.149  The Second
Circuit found none of these arguments persuasive and concluded that
“the district court applied the correct legal standard and did not commit
clear error[.]”150
On July 20, 2020, defendants filed a petition for a writ of certiorari to
the Supreme Court.151  The defendants asserted that the “recognized stat-
because the statute’s text does not distinguish artwork on its temporal status. Id.
(citing 17 U.S.C. § 101).
145. Id. at 168 (describing recent temporary artworks that would meet the
definition of “recognized stature”).  The Second Circuit proffered The Gates as an
example of artwork that would meet the “recognized standard” standard even
though it “lasted only two weeks but was the subject of significant critical acclaim
and attention, not just from the art world but also from the general public.” Id. at
167.  The Second Circuit also pointed to Banksy’s Girl with Balloon that “self-
destructed after selling for $1.4 million at Sotheby’s . . . the temporary quality of
this work has only added to its recognition.” Id.
146. Id. (“[T]he statute provides that ‘[t]he modification of a work of visual
art which is a result of the passage of time or the inherent nature of the materials is
not a distortion, mutilation, or other modification described in subsection
(a)(3)(A).’” (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 106A(c)(1))).  The Second Circuit also rejected
the defendants’ contention that the 5Pointz artists’ knowledge of the potential
destruction of the art precludes a VARA violation.  Id. at 168.  The court again
referenced the text of VARA, agreeing with the Eastern District of New York that
VARA accommodates those prospective situations by requiring a waiver or provid-
ing notice to the artists and notes that there is no evidence that this occurred. Id.
at 168–69.
147. Id. at 169 (“Wolkoff argues that the district court erred in several other
respects . . . [n]one of these contentions, considered separately or in the aggre-
gate, convinces us that any of Judge Block’s findings were clearly erroneous.”).
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 170 (affirming Eastern District of New York’s holding finding
VARA violations).
151. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 35, at *37; see also Blake
Brittain, N.Y. Developer Seeks SCOTUS Review of 5Pointz Graffiti Art Case, BLOOMBERG
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ure” standard was unconstitutionally vague.152  The Supreme Court de-
nied the petition for certiorari on October 5, 2020.153
V. THE LAST JUDGEMENT:154 A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE SECOND
CIRCUIT’S “RECOGNIZED STATURE” DEFINITION IN CASTILLO V.
G&M REALTY L.P.
This Section maintains the Second Circuit’s definition of “recognized
stature” elevates expert testimony over other types of evidence at the ex-
pense of protecting art outside the mainstream.  Subsection A asserts that
the Second Circuit’s “recognized stature” guidelines promote the protec-
tion of museum-quality artwork and potentially decrease the likelihood
that public art, such as protest art, will be safeguarded by VARA.  Under-
standing the difficult circumstance courts find themselves in when making
findings of “recognized stature,” this Note argues in Subsection B that the
Second Circuit should have considered “community standards” analysis as
a method of assessing “recognized stature” and proffers this analysis as a
viable tool for future adjudicators.
A. The Second Circuit’s Definition of “Recognized Stature” Leaves Public Art
Vulnerable
The Second Circuit’s revised definition of “recognized stature” does
not adequately address the role community perception plays in determin-
ing recognized stature.155  Particularly, the Second Circuit’s emphasis on
the opinion of “the artistic community  to determine ‘recognized stature’
places a higher premium on these ‘expert[ ]” opinions than the opinions
7d97e0814b01f2a467dfe0a55cca64ed76649c62 [https://perma.cc/B3PU-J6DY]
(“A New York property owner who was forced to pay $6.75 million for white-
washing a ‘mecca’ for graffiti art asked the U.S. Supreme Court on Monday to
reverse the ruling.”).
152. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 35, at *5–6 (claiming “rec-
ognized stature” violates the Fifth Amendment because “Congress neglected to de-
fine this novel phrase, which fails to provide a person of ordinary intelligence fair
notice of what is prohibited”).
153. Kyle Jahner, High Court Lets Artists’ $6.75M 5Pointz Graffiti Win Stand,
BLOOMBERG L. (Oct. 5, 2020), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/ip-law/high-court-
lets-artists-6-75m-5pointz-graffiti-win-stand?context=search&index=0 [https://
perma.cc/H6T6-6U9L].
154. See Michelangelo, THE LAST JUDGEMENT (Sistine Chapel, Musei Vaticani
1536–1541), http://www.museivaticani.va/content/museivaticani/en/collezioni/
musei/cappella-sistina/giudizio-universale.html [https://perma.cc/2FYE-Y9LZ]
(last visited July 9, 2021).  A stirring tableau from Michelangelo’s Sistine Chapel
masterwork, this particular scene illustrates the instant before Christ issues his final
ruling. See The Last Judgment, MUSEI VATICANI, http://www.museivaticani.va/
content/museivaticani/en/collezioni/musei/cappella-sistina/giudizio-
universale.html [https://perma.cc/2FYE-Y9LZ] (last visited July 9, 2021).
155. For the Second Circuit’s definition of “recognized stature,” see supra
notes 138–39 and accompanying text.  For a justification of why community opin-
ion is deserving of weight in the “recognized stature” analysis, see supra, note 57
and accompanying text.
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of the Carter court’s “cross-section of society.’”156  This definition that is
deferential to art experts also discounts the weight the Eastern District of
New York gave to both the advisory jury’s opinion and public opinion gen-
erally.157  The Second Circuit did acknowledge the relevance of nonpro-
fessional opinions when the court concluded that “expert testimony or
substantial evidence of non-expert recognition will generally be required
to establish recognized stature.”158
Nevertheless, when the Second Circuit described the “relevant com-
munity” as “typically [ ] the artistic community,” the court undermined
what it described as VARA’s goal to “protect[ ] ‘the public interest in pre-
serving [the] nation’s culture[.]’”159  This definition fails to protect art,
including protest and other forms of public art, that is, arguably, part of
the nation’s cultural heritage because of its community relevance and im-
pact, but that has not garnered the commendation of the artistic
community.160
Diagnosing this avertible gap in protection, the United States Copy-
right Office supports an expanded definition of recognized stature.161
156. Castillo v. G&M Realty L.P., 950 F.3d 155, 166 (2d Cir. 2020); Carter v.
Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 861 F. Supp. 303, 325 (S.D.N.Y 1995), aff’d in part, and va-
cated in part, and rev’d in part, 71 F.3d 77 (2d Cir. 1995) (providing “recognized
stature” test). For a discussion of the Carter test for recognized stature, see supra
notes 38–43 and accompanying text.
157. See Castillo, 950 F.3d at 165, 170 (noting “extensive lay testimony and
documentary evidence” but crediting “expert testimony” as the “linchpin of claims
of ‘recognized stature.’”)  For a discussion of the Eastern District of New York’s use
of the advisory jury and analysis of public opinion, see supra notes 96–97, 100,
126–29 and accompanying text.
158. Castillo, 950 F.3d at 166.
159. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Carter, 71 F.3d at 81); see also Rachel
Horn, Note, Highway Art Policy Revisited: Rethinking Transfers of Copyright Ownership
in State-Owned Transportation Artwork, 43 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 295, 305 (2020) (not-
ing that VARA analysis is particularly significant for public art because “public art is
. . . installed in common spaces—often dynamic places where a community’s plu-
ralistic interests and evolving needs may entail a greater likelihood of removal or
modification . . . .”).
160. See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 11, at 79 (describing shortcomings
of current “recognized stature” standard and offering commentary on remedial
measures).  In preparing the Report, the United States Copyright Office solicited
feedback from the New York Bar Association. See id.  A participant maintained
“the preservative aims of the recognized stature provision should not be undercut
by an inflexible dependence on a scholarly consensus of aesthetic importance” and
acknowledged that “[t]he recognized stature of such a localized work may not be
primarily aesthetic in nature at all; the work may have become iconic for non-
aesthetic reasons, or it may reflect the social concerns of the community in a way
that an acknowledged masterpiece may not.” Id.  (citing Art Law Committee of the
New York City Bar Association, Comments Submitted in Response to U.S. Copy-
right Office’s Jan. 23, 2017, Notice of Inquiry 5 (Mar. 27, 2017).  A participant
critiqued the “recognized stature standard” as “too narrow, especially in the con-
text of public art (e.g. murals, large-scale sculptures) where the value of the art is
rooted in the community where the art resides.” Id. (citing Art Law Committee of
the New York City Bar Association, supra note 160, at 5).
161. See id. at 80 (proposing legislative amendment of VARA).
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The United States Copyright Office described the Eastern District of New
York’s opinion as “potentially address[ing] some of these concerns regard-
ing the exclusion of certain types of art.”162  Endorsing the Eastern Dis-
trict of New York’s “proposed standard,” the United States Copyright
Office recognized that “the local community’s relationship with the art-
work” should be a factor in judicial decision making about “recognized
stature.”163  The Office supports “a broader interpretation . . . that ac-
counts for the opinions of those beyond the academic community,” ex-
panding VARA’s sanctuary to more types of art in alignment with
legislative intent.164  Additionally, as public art often deliberately subsists
outside of the broader art establishment context and can be assessed with-
out the intermediary of the museum or the interpretation of art experts,
wholesale reliance on art expert opinion may be misplaced.165
B. Can “Community Standards” Jurisprudence Assist Courts in Making
“Recognized Stature” Decisions?
The Second Circuit also did not address the viability of the Eastern
District of New York’s allusion to “community-based standards” as a
method of evaluating “recognized stature.”166  In its opinion, the Second
Circuit did not respond to the Eastern District of New York’s use of the
advisory jury or meaningfully remark on the Eastern District of New York’s
lengthy findings of community recognition to support its findings of rec-
162. Id. (reviewing Eastern District of New York’s Castillo opinion); see also
Brittain, supra note 8 (describing Second Circuit’s “recognized stature” analysis
and relating to United States Copyright Office’s report).  In considering the appli-
cation of VARA to protest art, Attorney Megan Noh noted the possibility that local
art that has attained “huge significance to people in the community[ ] . . . may not
be on the radar of worldwide art critics.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Another commentator has noted the Eastern District of New York’s opinion em-
braces a broader definition of “recognized stature” because the Eastern District of
New York did not require the plaintiffs to prove the market value of the art issue,
indicating a “liberalizing shift in judicial understandings of what qualifies as a work
of ‘recognized stature.’”  Horn, supra note 159, at 307.
163. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 11, 79–80.
164. Id.  The United States Copyright Office summarizes participant feedback
on this point as “the less established the artist and less relevant their work is to
scholarly research, the more attention should be given to the community’s opinion
and not necessarily the expert’s . . . .” Id. at 79.
165. See Peplow, supra note 66, at 898.  Though certainly art experts are capa-
ble of testifying to the significance of art in any context, art outside of museums
seems to self-evidently invite analysis of its significance from non-art expert
sources.
166. See Cohen v. G & M Realty L.P., 320 F. Supp. 3d 421, 430 (E.D.N.Y.
2018), aff’d sub. nom. Castillo v. G & M Realty L.P., 950 F.3d 155 (2d Cir. 2020), cert.
denied, 141 S. Ct. 363 (2020) (quoting NAACP v. Acusport Corp., 226 F. Supp. 2d
391, 398 (E.D.N.Y. 2002)).  Additionally, defendants’ petition for writ of certiorari
also dismissed the application of “ ‘community standards’ provisions” without de-
tailed analysis.  Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 35, at 29 n.20 (citing
Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 812 (2011) (Alito, J., concurring)).
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ognized stature.167  Instead, the Second Circuit credited the ample “ex-
pert testimony, which is often the linchpin of claims of ‘recognized
stature.’”168  Notwithstanding the policy reasons supporting a broader def-
inition of “recognized stature” that recognizes community appreciation of
art, the use of a “community standards” approach may prove to be a useful
tool for courts struggling with the means to address “recognized stat-
ure.”169  Despite Justice Alito’s proscription of the use of “community stan-
dards” outside the obscenity context in Brown, applying “community
standards” for “recognized stature” determinations does not suffer from
the same deficiencies that applying “community standards” to violence
does.170  Opinions about art are fundamentally personal and necessarily
diverse.171  Even with that understanding, the use of “community stan-
dards” to evaluate “recognized stature” would not rely on unanimous opin-
ion to dispositively turn the “recognized stature” classification on and off
like a light switch.172  Instead,  “community standards” can be leveraged as
a factor in determining recognized stature, alongside expert testimony,
similar to the methodology the Eastern District of New York employed in
Castillo.173  Notably, the Miller use of “community standards” encourages a
local standard, aligning with the Eastern District of New York’s use of an
advisory jury made up of members of the local community.174  Further-
more, the case law verifies the jury’s unique ability to apply “community
167. See Castillo, 950 F.3d at 166–70 (evaluating Eastern District of New York’s
findings of “recognized stature”).  The Second Circuit acknowledged the Eastern
District of New York’s use of “extensive lay testimony and documentary evidence”
but did not go beyond this to explore community recognition, instead favoring
expert testimony. Id. at 170.
168. See id. at 170 (emphasis added) (citing Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc.,
861 F. Supp. 303, 325 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
169. See supra notes Section II.C for a description of why courts struggle with
art adjudication.  On the policy front, public art generally is an integral part of
community building. See Horn, supra note 159, at 320 (“Public art is a well-recog-
nized means of beautifying shared spaces, fostering community identity and
strengthening communal values, encouraging economic development, improving
civic participation, and generally enhancing a population’s quality of life.”).
170. See supra notes 94–95 and accompanying text for a description of Justice
Alito’s concerns about “community standards” analysis.
171. See Brian Soucek, supra note 75, at 420 (describing Justice Scalia’s per-
spective on art opinions).  Soucek recalls Justice Scalia’s concurrence in Pope v.
Illinois, when Justice Scalia stated “[j]ust as there is no use about arguing about
taste, there is no use litigating about it.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 505 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring)).
172. See supra note 95 and accompanying text for Justice Alito’s reasoning
that “community standards” are not appropriate analytical tools outside of
obscenity.
173. See supra notes 96–97, 100, 126–29 and accompanying text for a descrip-
tion of the Eastern District of New York’s use of “community standards” to find
“recognized stature.”
174. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24, 30–34 (1973) (first quoting Kois v.
Wisconsin, 408 U.S. 229, 230 (1972); then quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S.
476, 489 (1957)). See supra notes 88–91 and accompanying text for a description
of Miller’s definition of what makes up the community in “community standards,”
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standards” and provide local perspective in adjudicating sensitive issues of
fact.175
Judicial agita about aesthetic judgments is well-documented.176  Rely-
ing on juries, particularly the rarely used advisory jury, to assess commu-
nity impact of works of art will greatly assist courts in making these
decisions while simultaneously extending the definition of  “recognized
stature” in accordance with the aims of VARA and the United States Copy-
right Office’s aspiration.177  At the very least, the Second Circuit should
have credited and evaluated the Eastern District of New York’s continued
emphasis on the role of the advisory jury and community opinion to pro-
vide well-defined precedent for future adjudications of this undeniably
nebulous copyright statute.178
VI. THE PERSISTENCE OF MEMORY:179 THE FATE OF PROTEST ART
The Second Circuit’s interpretation of “recognized stature” has signif-
icant implications for the preservation of recent protest art and the ave-
nues both artists and art advocates have open to them to preserve protest
art.180 The deficiencies in the Second Circuit’s construction of “recog-
nized stature” alleviate none of the concerns with the application of the
“recognized stature” standard.181  Instead, this definition permits the pos-
sibility of judicial misappropriation and leaves artworks vulnerable to de-
struction and their creators without a legal remedy.182  In an interview,
and notes 96–97, 100, 126–29 and accompanying text for the Eastern District of
New York’s characterization of local jury members.
175.  See supra notes 96–97, 100–02 and accompanying text for a description
of cases where judges either relied on or noted the importance of juries in apply-
ing “community standards.”
176. See supra Section I.C for considerations of judicial disquiet about “judg-
ing” art.
177. See supra notes 57, 161–64 for a description of the legislative intent be-
hind VARA and the United States Copyright’s Office perspective on desired modi-
fications to the definition of “recognized stature.”
178. See supra notes 96–97, 100, 126–29 and accompanying text for a descrip-
tion of the Eastern District of New York’s use of the advisory jury and notes 157–58
and accompanying text for a critique of the Second Circuit’s failure to adequately
address the Eastern District of New York’s consideration of the advisory jury and
community opinion generally.
179. See Salvador Dalı́, THE PERSISTENCE OF MEMORY (The Museum of Modern
Art 1931), https://www.moma.org/collection/works/79018 [https://perma.cc/
GY76-5V9T] (last visited July 9, 2021).  Melding Dalı́’s absurdist imagination with
his homeland landscape in its portrayal of everyday objects losing their temporal
physicality, this piece embodies Dalı́’s obsession with time’s degenerative effects.
See The Persistence of Memory, THE MUSEUM OF MODERN ART, https://
www.moma.org/collection/works/79018 [https://perma.cc/GY76-5V9T] (last
visited July 9, 2021).
180. See Brittain, supra note 8 (noting uncertainty of whether VARA applies to
protest art).
181. For critiques of VARA, and “recognized stature” in particular, see supra
notes 31–35 and accompanying text.
182. See Thornley, supra note 29, at 364 (noting application of “recognized
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Sarah Henry, Chief Curator of the Museum of the City of New York, re-
counted how “[s]o many movements in U.S. history have taken on a life in
a single image . . . George Floyd’s face, as captured by artists, is one of
those.”183
Nevertheless, recently created protest art is already being de-
stroyed.184  One activist finds her motivation to preserve protest art be-
cause “[t]hese walls speak . . . they’re expression of communities.  We want
these feelings, hopes, calls to action to live on.”185  Art historian T.J. Clark
notes that art will forever be an amber of the moment “when the painter
stands in front of the canvas, the sculptor asks his model to stand still,” or
perhaps in today’s cultural landscape, the aerosol artist shakes the spray
paint canister, or the muralist wets the tip of their brush.186  Embracing a
broader definition of recognized stature, grounded in “community stan-
dards” analysis, will encourage the continued development and apprecia-
tion of this art.187  Artists, preservationists, and other professionals
removed protest art for preservation and display in other spaces as recent
protest art cannot exist in the public sphere indefinitely.188  Projects of
stature” risks inconsistent interpretations from judges and juries”); Crosson et al.,
supra note 3 (noting protest art’s exposure to demolition).  One commentator ex-
plained all public art is at risk, stating, “[i]t is public artists that are perhaps most
in need of moral rights, and yet the work of these artists is often ignored by and
excluded from the legal definition of art in VARA. And this is despite the rise of
public art in cultural importance and popularity.”  Stewart, supra note 11, at 1234.
183. CBS This Morning, Amid the Racial Justice Movement, Artists Wield Their Art
as a Tool for Change, YOUTUBE (Sep. 3, 2009), https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=&UorDsxL4 [https://perma.cc/Y7BB-7XVJ] (CBS This Morning’s
Anthony Mason interviews Sarah Henry about museum exhibition “New York
Responds”).
184. See Crosson et al., supra note 3 (“Ant Ben hoped his painting would have
a life in a Chicago public school once the restaurant decided to take the boards
down, but the piece disappeared before that was possible.”).  Chicago residents
expressed concern about the destruction of the art. See id.  One commentator also
pointed to the importance of public art generally that contributes to both “shared
cultural identities in communities” and drives economic prosperity and “urban de-
velopment, as “cit[ies] with public art attract[ ] young, creative, and educated peo-
ple; [this] communicates that the city is vibrant, innovative, and diverse; and even
appeals to tourists.”  Stewart, supra note 11, at 1238.  Stewart asserted that “not only
does public art play a role in building the culture of a community, some commu-
nity cultures are built around public art.” Id.
185. The Associated Press, Artists, Activists Rush to Save Black Lives Matter
Murals, NBC NEWS (Dec. 14, 2020), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/nbcblk/art-
ists-activists-rush-save-black-lives-matter-murals-n1251113 [https://perma.cc/
B4KW-6GX9]  (interviewing Kenda Zellner-Smith, co-founder of Save the Boards
to Memorialize the Movement, a preservationist effort to save Black Lives Matter
protest art).
186. CLARK, supra note 1, at 12.
187. See Stewart, supra note 11, at 1264 (“Reform [of VARA] is necessary to
protect and encourage the continued creation of these artworks”).
188. See Marissa J. Lang, Protest Art Covered Shuttered Businesses for Months at
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this type would encourage property owners to exercise VARA’s notice pro-
vision, which bars liability for property owners who give artists the oppor-
tunity to remove the art at their own cost as an alternative to outright
destruction.  This fulfills VARA’s preservationist goals while also providing
property owners a viable exit option.189  Nevertheless, should artists need
to turn to the courts to remedy destruction of works of “recognized stat-
ure,” artists should be mindful of VARA’s restrictions, particularly courts’
historical unwillingness to find VARA protects art installed without permis-
sion and the lack of protection for removable works rooted within
buildings.190
Since the Second Circuit’s ruling, VARA litigation has risen
sharply.191  Several of these cases highlights the relevance of community
perspective in making findings of “recognized stature.”192  Following the
closure of a queer bar, The Stud, due to COVID-19-related financial dis-
tress, the bar’s landlords painted over “iconic” murals on the exterior of
the building during Pride 2020.193  Painted to commemorate The Stud’s
new cooperative ownership in 2019, one of the mural artists stated the art
“convey[ed] that [The Stud] was a space that was safe for everyone.  It was
the start of a new generation.”194  In November 2020, the artists filed a suit
LXCH] (describing efforts to move Black Lives Matter murals from Washington
D.C.’s Black Lives Matter plaza to exhibition space for future display).
189. See 17 U.S.C.A. § 113(d)(2) (West 2021) (describing requirements of lia-
bility-less removal for property owners); see also Robinson, supra note 22, at 1948
(“When the work can be removed without causing the [ ] harm, however, moral
rights do apply, unless the building owner makes an unsuccessful good-faith at-
tempt to contact the artist who fails to remove the work or pay for its removal.”).
190. See supra note 200 and accompanying text for a description of case law
considering whether VARA protects art placed without permission of the property
owner. See infra note 200 for further analysis on the likelihood of protection of
non-permissive art.  See supra note 30 and accompanying text for a comment on
VARA’s limitations.
191. See Blake Brittain, Activist Artists Cite Novel N.Y. Win to Sue Over Threats to
Work, BLOOMBERG L. (Feb. 1, 2021), https://www.bloomberglaw.com/bloomberg
lawnews/us-law-week/X4O5DOM0000000?bna_news_filter=US-law-week#jcite
[https://perma.cc/N4VX-ZH5D] (comparing filing of six VARA cases in past
three months to only 100 VARA filings post 1997, averaging four a year).  Brittain
speculated that the recent influx of VARA cases may be due to the publicity sur-
rounding the artist’s monumental win in Castillo. Id.  Not only do artists and law-
yers now, at the very least, know this avenue of relief exists, but they may be more
likely to pursue claims following the potential for lucrative damages awards. See id.
192. See id. (describing complaint of LGBTQ artists against landlord who de-
stroyed community-cherished murals).
193. See Amanda Bartlett, Artists of Iconic Mural at the Stud Sue Building Owner
for ‘Whitewashing’ Their Work, SFGATE, https://www.sfgate.com/sf-culture/article/
artists-sue-building-owner-whitewashing-stud-mural-15732095.php [https://
perma.cc/25PW-VQKQ] (last updated Nov. 17, 2020) (describing timeline of mu-
ral destruction).
194. Amanda Bartlett, ‘We Will Not Be Erased’: Graffiti Artist Strikes Back After SF
Queer Bar’s Mural is Painted Over During Pride, SFGATE, https://www.sfgate.com/sf-
culture/slideshow/The-mural-on-SF-s-oldest-queer-bar-was-painted-204388.php
[https://perma.cc/5QS4-DBAK] (last updated Nov. 16, 2020, 5:13 PM) (interview-
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alleging VARA violations in the Northern District of California against the
landlord of the building; the suit is in mediation before a jury trial in
September 2022.195  The artists’ complaint asserts that the murals meet
the “recognized stature” standard, highlighting the murals’ community
resonance and subsequent ire following the murals’ destruction.196
This pending litigation stresses how public art is integral to commu-
nity building: it memorializes triumphs, acknowledges hardships, and sig-
nals community identity and kinship.197  Nevertheless, a “recognized
stature” definition contingent on art expert testimony may find these
murals unworthy of inclusion under VARA despite their cultural merit.198
A particularly poignant example of this predicament is the Museum
of Modern Art (MoMA)’s alleged removal of Black Lives Matter protest art
placed on the boarded-up storefront of MoMA’s design store in SoHo.199
MoMA’s potential legal liability for destroying the art is an open question,
as the works were placed without permission.200  Nevertheless, the artist
behind the protest art, Amir Diop, compellingly distills why leaving the
definition of art up to art institutions is problematic:
It just seems as though MoMa [sic] determined what’s art, and
what’s not art . . . If I’m not a dead Black artist, they don’t want to
ing Xara Thustra, co-artist of Queer Trans Spaces mural created during 2017 Pride
week).
195. See Complaint at 1, 7, Canilao v. City Commercial Inv. LLC, No. 3:20-cv-
03030 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 13, 2020); Civil Minutes of Initial Case Management Confer-
ence, Canilao, No. 320-cv-03030, ECF No, 23 (recording parties’ consent to court-
sponsored mediation and scheduling of jury trial).
196. See Complaint, supra note 115, at 5–7 (describing how “[t]he community
venerated the [m]urals” and the “outpouring of emotions and stories” chronicled
by local news).
197. See supra notes 193–96 and accompanying text for the community im-
pact of the works at issue in the ongoing suit.  Likewise, Soho artist Amir Diop
described his intentions for his art created during Black Lives Matter protests in
summer 2020: “My hope is that [my art] is a part of history . . . [w]e can teach kids
in the future that this is what happened in 2020 . . . .” Justine Calma, Protest Art
Leaves The Streets, VERGE (Oct. 21, 2021), https://www.theverge.com/21509952/
street-art-murals-black-lives-matter-blm-protests-new-york-city-artists [https://
perma.cc/ABQ3-THRG].
198. For a description of the risk inherent in depending predominantly on
expert opinion in “recognized stature” determinations, see supra Section IV.A and
accompanying text.
199. See Calma, supra note 197 (describing “shredd[ing]” of mural just days
after it was placed).
200. See id. (noting artist did not have MoMA’s consent to paint the mural).
Courts have interpreted lack of consent to bar VARA claims.  See supra note 56 and
accompanying text.  Dicta in Castillo may open the door to reconsideration of this
principle as the Second Circuit named Bansky as an example of artists befitting the
“recognized stature” designation even though Banksy’s trademark is “unautho-
rized art,” leading to the conclusion that “other unauthorized works could receive
VARA moral rights protections.” Intellectual Property—Copyright-Second Circuit Finds
Temporary Art Protected Under the Visual Artists Rights Act.—Castillo v. G&M Realty
L.P., 950 F.3d 155 (2d Cir. 2020), 134 HARV. L. REV. 1881, 1887-88 (2021).
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hear from me . . . .  They destroyed a piece from this movement.
When I am dead, they’ll be looking for the works that I’ve
made.201
The relevance of community opinion poses interesting questions
about art that does not reflect the values of a community.202  Vermont Law
School recently confronted this issue following student criticism of a mu-
ral that depicted the Underground Railroad in a racially insensitive man-
ner.203  Originally intending to remove the mural, Vermont Law School
instead decided to shield the mural from view after the artist pursued
VARA litigation.204  The District of Vermont denied the artist’s prelimi-
nary injunction to bar Vermont Law School from inserting panels to hide
the mural on the basis that concealing the murals does not violate VARA’s
proscription of either destruction or modification.205  Nevertheless, the
District of Vermont anticipated the murals would likely meet the “recog-
nized stature” standard due to favorable press coverage at the time of the
mural’s installation, approbative statements from “two witnesses with expe-
rience in selecting and exhibiting visual art,” and the absence of conflict-
ing evidence from Vermont Law School.206
These types of divergent opinions from experts and the community
raise new uncertainties about future VARA litigation: does VARA, and the
“recognized stature” designation specifically, distinguish between the
201. Calma, supra note 197 (interviewing Amir Diop).
202. See Daniel Grant, Vermont Law School Can Hide a Mural that Offended Stu-
dents Behind a Wall, Court Rules, ART NEWSPAPER (Mar. 17, 2021), https://
www.theartnewspaper.com/news/vermont-law-school-can-hide-a-mural-that-of-
fended-students-behind-a-wall-court-rules [https://perma.cc/YC2R-A8AT]
(describing student reproach of mural).  The Vermont Law School dean’s state-
ment following censure of the mural states “the mural is not consistent with our
School’s commitment to fairness, inclusion, diversity, and social justice.” See id.
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Vermont Law School Plans to Paint Over
Mural Deemed Racist, ASSOCIATED PRESS (July 9, 2020), https://apnews.com/article/
293513059e1c2e244a0f53b8318b7606 [https://perma.cc/DA3C-5UBA].
203. See id. (describing mixed community opinion of mural, particularly ad-
monishment of both content of mural and “cartoonish” depictions of people of
color).
204. See Margaret Grayson, Judge Says Vermont Law School Can Cover Controver-
sial Murals, SEVEN DAYS (Mar. 17, 2021), https://www.sevendaysvt.com/LiveCul-
ture/archives/2021/03/17/judge-says-vermont-law-school-can-cover-controversial-
murals [https://perma.cc/AHE3-C483] (describing Vermont Law School’s initial
strategy to “paint over” or detach the mural before deciding to place the mural
behind panels).
205. See Complaint at 9–11, Kerson v. Vt. Law Sch., Inc., No. 5:20-cv-00202-
gwc (D. Vt. March 10, 2021) (“[T[he language of the VARA does not include a
protection against concealment or removal from display of artworks by the
owner.”).  Due to the dubious possibility of the artists’ success on the VARA claim
for these reasons, the court denied the preliminary injunction. Id. at 11.
206. Id. at 7–8 (finding works at issue would likely meet “recognized stature”
standard).
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“problematic nature” of art and “aesthetics?”207  If so, can a work’s “recog-
nized stature” designation change over time?208  The answers to these
questions, and how courts should decide them, is beyond the scope of this
Note.  Nevertheless, the very existence of these thorny questions illumi-
nates precisely why it is so critical that courts take judicial notice of com-
munity perspective in “recognized stature” determinations.
207. See Brittain, supra note 191 (quoting interview with art lawyer Kate
Lucas).
208. See id. (art attorney Kate Lucas raises possibility that work’s “recognized
stature” status is impermanent); see also Keshawn M. Harry, Note, A Shattered Visage:
The Fluctuation Problem with the Recognized Stature Provision in the Visual Artists Rights
Act of 1990, 9 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 193, 201–03 (2001) (noting possibility of “recog-
nized stature” status “fluctuat[ing] over time” and resulting challenges for courts
to serve VARA’s “preservative purpose”).
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